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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays studying the dynamic and strategic interactions
of oligopolistic rms in developing countries using dynamic structural models. We focus
on industries which have positive social benets for the communities in which they op-
erate, namely radio and banking. We use the estimated models to simulate counterfactual
policies aimed at improving access for individuals in underserved areas.
The rst essay studies the social impacts of the liberalization of the radio broadcast-
ing sector in Ghana. I analyze how the regulator aects commercial stations’ decisions to
enter and the resulting eects of coverage spillovers in rural areas. I exploit random vari-
ation in radio coverage caused by coverage spilling through gaps in mountainous areas
and use this to estimate the eects of coverage on malaria incidence and development. I
then estimate a dynamic structural entry model for commercial stations. In counterfac-
tual simulations, I nd that the allowance of more powerful transmitters is particularly
eective in delivering the social benets of radio to new communities.
The second essay (joint with Calixte Ahokossi) studies voter turnout and regulatory
ineciency in the radio broadcasting market in Benin. We nd an inverted-U relationship
between the number of radio stations and voter turnout. We estimate a dynamic structural
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model for radio stations, taking into account the regulatory ineciency in the market.
Counterfactual simulations suggest that either removing the regulatory ineciency or
introducing targeted entry subsidies can spur entry in areas without radio stations, which
would increase voter turnout in these areas.
The third essay (joint with Marc Rysman and Robert M. Townsend) studies the bank-
ing sector in Thailand. Here, we argue that the eect of nancial crises on bank branch lo-
cation choices provides an unexplored channel by which crises aect access to credit. We
estimate a dynamic structural model of oligopolistic location choice, allowing for comple-
mentarity in payos for bank branches in nearby locations, as well as competitive eects
between rival banks. Using this model, we can predict counterfactual expansions of the
bank branch network under policies focused on opening rural bank branches, or in the
absence of the 1997 nancial crisis.
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Preface
The prot-maximizing behavior of rms often brings greater social benets to communi-
ties than rms internalize. Therefore there may be fewer rms than optimal, particularly
less-protable areas. The government may ll this gap by creating public rms to in-
crease coverage. However, in developing economies, these may remain under-provided.
Two examples of industries with social benets are radio broadcasting and banking. Radio
broadcasting and mass media generally has been found in the literature to have positive
eects on a wide range of outcomes, such as political participation, political preferences,
government responsiveness, fertility, education and health. Radio can also inform individ-
uals of spreading diseases and adverse weather, which can save lives. Banking services, on
the other hand, benet communities by fostering investment, growth and consumption
smoothing. However, being located far away from the nearest bank branch can decrease
access to nancial services. While this is partly due to transportation costs, distance also
exacerbates the information asymmetries associated with lending. This is particularly rel-
evant in developing economies because credit histories may be unreliable or non-existent
and because bank branches rely on informal methods to assess the viability of loans.
Commercial rms in these industries are typically highly regulated. For example, ra-
dio stations must obtain broadcasting licenses and conform to various broadcasting re-
strictions due to the nature of the frequency spectrum. A centralized body must allocate
the frequency spectrum in such a way that frequencies do not overlap. Banks also face
heavy regulations from the central bank. Regulations imposing restrictions and licensing
fees may make it not worthwhile for rms to enter in less-protable areas, resulting in
an under-provision. Therefore the regulatory environment these rms face can directly
impact their entry decisions into dierent markets.
Industries such as radio broadcasting and banking are also often oligopolistic. Study-
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ing the behavior of rms in such industries is complex, as rms’ actions may depend on
their expectations of the future actions of rivals. For example, rms may preemptively
enter in certain areas to discourage competition. Firms choosing a network of locations,
such as banks choosing their branch network, have an even more complex problem. This
is because a bank’s prots depend on the entire network of its branch locations. As a
result, the rms’ strategic interactions would be impossible to capture in a simple static
model. A structural model capturing these dynamic and strategic incentives of rms is
necessary in order to simulate the eects of alternative regulation schemes.
In this dissertation, I study three examples of these industries in various developing
countries: the radio broadcasting market in both Ghana and Benin and the banking in-
dustry in Thailand. In each chapter, I discuss and study the benets of the presence of
these rms in the wider community and estimate entry models of these rms using dy-
namic structural models. Using these estimated structural models, I can predict the entry
patterns under alternative scenarios, such as alternative regulation schemes, and evaluate
how eective alternative policies are using the estimated eects of the rms on the wider
communities.
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Chapter 1
Social Impacts of New Radio Markets in
Ghana: A Dynamic Structural Analysis
1.1 Introduction
Exposure to mass media has been found to have eects on a wide range of social and
economic outcomes, such as voter turnout, fertility, and education. In many develop-
ing countries, radio is the most popular form of mass media, as lower literacy rates and
electricity penetration rule out newspapers, television and internet for many individuals.
Having access to radio coverage is therefore important to inform listeners of important
issues. The radio broadcasting sector is highly regulated since radio makes use of the lim-
ited frequency spectrum. These regulations can impact the entry and location decisions of
radio stations, which aects which areas receive radio coverage. This can have resulting
eects on the social and economic outcomes of communities.
In Ghana, the media was under state control until a new constitution was promul-
gated in 1992 which allowed the entry of privately-owned radio stations. Since then there
has been a large rise in the number of commercial radio stations, with over 300 commer-
cial stations entering in the rst twenty years. The entry of commercial radio stations
is regulated in a number of dimensions which can aect how many stations enter and
whether coverage will spread to rural areas. Licensing fees and restrictions on transmit-
ter strengths may result in radio coverage being underprovided.
In this paper, I use data from Ghana’s broadcasting regulator and topographical data
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to compute the coverage area for each radio station. Using these data, I rst estimate the
positive eects of radio coverage in reduced form. I then estimate a dynamic structural
entry model of radio station competition using the network of overlapping coverage areas.
Using this estimated model, I simulate the change in entry patterns under counterfactual
regulation schemes and the resulting social and economic eects on the communities
receiving radio coverage.
To explore the positive eects of radio coverage, I exploit random variation in coverage
caused by coverage spilling through gaps in mountainous areas. Radio stations choose
their broadcasting location to broadcast to the population living nearby. The spread of
this coverage around the source will eventually be blocked by hilly terrain. However,
coverage often manages to spill through gaps in mountainous areas in the form of streaks.
If these coverage streaks are suciently far away from the source, then the radio station is
unlikely to have strategically placed its radio mast in order to capture a specic location
that is near the border of a coverage streak. Therefore the locations near the borders
of these streaks received coverage in an as-if random fashion. Using these streaks of
spill-through coverage, I use a geographic regression discontinuity design to estimate the
eects of coverage on dierent outcomes.
One outcome variable I use is malaria incidence among children, as measured by the
Malaria Atlas Project (Bhatt et al., 2015). Malaria is prevalent throughout all regions in
Ghana and is the largest cause of mortality in the country. Radio has the potential to warn
listeners of the risks of malaria and give information on how to prevent it. One way in
which radio informs about malaria and other health-related issues is through “edutain-
ment” programs. These are entertaining shows such as soap operas that also include in-
formative messages such as how to prevent contracting diseases. I nd that individuals in
areas that receive coverage experience an additional 1.4% drop in malaria incidence within
a ve-year period over a baseline drop of 7%. To explore the mechanism behind this result,
2
I merge the radio coverage data with Demographic Health Survey data. I nd that areas
with radio coverage are 17% more likely to have their children sleep under mosquito bed
nets. Another outcome variable I use is nighttime luminosity as seen from space, which
has been used in the literature as a proxy for local GDP. Nighttime luminosity increases
an additional 15% over the baseline after a 5-year period.
Since radio makes use of a limited frequency spectrum, radio stations are subject to
signicant policy oversight. Stations typically compete in oligopoly markets, involving
many dynamic and strategic interactions. In order to study the eects of regulation on
radio station entry, it is necessary to estimate a dynamic structural model to capture these
strategic interactions. Furthermore, a structural model is necessary to evaluate counter-
factual regulation schemes.
In the model, potential entrants choose whether or not to obtain broadcasting licenses
based on their expectations of the number of future competitors and the number of po-
tential listeners. The technology of radio broadcasting allows for a natural measure of
competition and market size for each station, rather than using administrative areas to
partition the country into separate markets. Radio stations compete if their coverage ar-
eas overlap and the potential listenership of a station is the population living within the
station’s coverage area. The overlapping coverage areas form a network of competing sta-
tions across the country. The model can incorporate spillovers throughout the network,
where stations that indirectly compete can react to deviations in rms’ strategies.
I evaluate counterfactual regulation schemes using the estimated structural model to-
gether with estimates of the positive eects of radio coverage. One regulation imposed on
commercial radio stations is a maximum broadcasting radius. I consider a counterfactual
where stations are allowed to have transmitters that are twice as strong. The eect of
such a policy change on entry is not obvious ex-ante. On the one hand, radio stations
could have a larger base of listeners which would make entry more attractive. On the
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other hand, however, they may experience more competition, which would make entry
less attractive. I nd that allowing stronger transmitters modestly increases the overall
number of radio stations but expands coverage to locations that did not receive coverage
before. In another counterfactual, I nd that reducing entry costs increases overall entry
substantially, but does not increase the number of extra individuals covered as much as
the previous counterfactual of allowing stronger transmitter strengths. Given that I nd
that the positive external benets of radio coverage are mostly on the extensive margin, a
policy allowing stronger transmitter strengths would be more eective in delivering the
benets of radio to communities.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows. Radio coverage maps and irregular
terrain have previously been used to estimate the eects of radio and television coverage.
However, my identication strategy diers from previous work in that I use coverage
streaks in a geographic regression discontinuity design. This paper adds to the literature
exploring the eects of mass media, focusing on the eects of radio on malaria incidence
and growth. I also contribute to the estimation of dynamic entry models literature by
incorporating a number of unique features to the model. In structural entry models, it is
common to partition the country into independent markets. Since radio stations compete
if they overlap in radio coverage, I let the coverage areas of the stations determine which
stations compete with one another. This implicitly forms a network among the radio
stations and incorporates the possibility of spillovers from a station’s actions throughout
the network. Using the coverage maps in the model also allows for the estimation of
unique counterfactual experiments, such as the eects of doubling transmitter strengths
on stations’ entry decisions.
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Related Literature
There is a wide literature studying the eects of mass media on an array of outcomes.
Gentzkow (2006), Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel (2009), Gentzkow, Shapiro, and Sink-
inson (2011) and Cagé (2017) study the eect of media on voter turnout while Gerber,
Karlan, and Bergan (2009), Enikolopov, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya (2011), Larreguy, Mar-
shall, and Snyder Jr (2014), Garcia-Arenas (2016) and Durante, Pinotti, and Tesei (2017)
study its eect on political leaning. Strömberg (2004), Besley, Burgess et al. (2002) and
Snyder and Strömberg (2010) nd that government responsiveness and political account-
ability are greater in areas with better media coverage. Farré and Fasani (2013) nd media
lowers migration and Keefer and Khemani (2014) nd positive eects on parental invest-
ment in children’s education. Jensen and Oster (2009) nd an increase in women’s status
in the household and lower domestic violence. La Ferrara, Chong, and Duryea (2012) nd
that soap operas lower fertility and Kearney and Levine (2015) nd that reality TV leads
to fewer teenage pregnancies.
Not all of the eects of mass media are positive, however. Olken (2009) nds that radio
and television lower social capital and trust. DellaVigna, Enikolopov, Mironova, Petrova,
and Zhuravskaya (2014) nd increased nationalism and ethnically oensive grati from
cross-border coverage and Yanagizawa-Drott (2014) nds increased violence in Rwanda
from propaganda on the radio. Paluck (2009) and Paluck and Green (2009), however, nd
that educational radio soap operas reduced violence in Rwanda. Notwithstanding, the
majority of the eects of mass media are positive, particularly for radio. This motivates
studying how regulation and competition aect the entry decisions of radio stations, as
they can deliver important benets.
This paper also adds to the literature on the estimation of dynamic games of imperfect
competition. Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (2007), Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002, 2007),
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Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2007) and Pesendorfer and Schmidt-Dengler (2008) each
provide two-step methods to estimate these models based on Ericson and Pakes (1995).
Applications of these methods include Ryan (2012), Collard-Wexler (2013), Dunne, Klimek,
Roberts, and Xu (2013), Lin (2015) and Ahokpossi and Walsh (2018). A notable dierence
in this paper, however, is that I do not partition the country into a set of independent
markets ex-ante. Instead, I allow the network of overlapping coverage areas from each
radio station decide which stations compete with one another.
There has also been previous work on the radio broadcasting industry. Berry and
Waldfogel (1999) and Berry, Eizenberg, and Waldfogel (2016) nd that there is more entry
than is socially optimal in US radio markets. In this paper, I nd that radio is underpro-
vided in a number of communities. Sweeting (2009, 2010, 2013) studies advertising times,
mergers and musical performance rights and Jeziorski (2015, 2014a,b) studies ownership
caps and mergers in the US radio industry. However, due to data limitations, exploring
these issues in this setting would be beyond the scope of this paper.
1.2 Background: FM Broadcasting in Ghana
Ghana has a population of approximately 27 million and has a land mass similar to the
state of Oregon or the United Kingdom. It is located on the coast of West Africa, border-
ing Côte d’Ivoire, Togo and Burkina Faso. Ghana achieved independence from the United
Kingdom in 1957. Since then, the country went through various military governments
where the media was under state control and used as a means of propaganda. This ended
in 1992 when a new constitution allowed the entry of private media in Ghana. However,
the government at the time delayed the provision and allocation of broadcasting licenses
to private owners. In 1994, a pirate radio station, Radio EYE, was set up in the nation’s cap-
ital Accra as a form of protest which pressured the government to begin issuing licenses.
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The National Communications Authority (NCA) was then established as the regulator
overseeing the issuing of broadcasting licenses.
Radio is arguably the most important form of mass media in Ghana, as well as in other
developing countries. For many individuals, radio may be the only form of mass media
available to them. According to the 2010 Housing and Population Census, adult literacy
was 74.1% which rules out newspapers for a quarter of the population. Only 64.2% of
households reported using electricity. Even those with electricity, power outages (known
locally as Dumsor) are very frequent. This rules out televisions for a large portion of the
population. Furthermore, only 7.9% of households owned a desktop or laptop computer
and only 7.8% of the population 12 years and older had access to the internet. In rural
areas, literacy, electricity penetration and internet penetration are even lower. Radios
are inexpensive and do not always require electricity to operate. They can be run on
batteries and hand crank radios are also available. Radio stations can operate at a very
local level due to the lower cost of creating content compared to television, allowing them
to broadcast in the local language of the community. The country has a population of 27
million, yet there are over 50 actively spoken languages.
For licensing purposes, radio stations in Ghana are classied as one of ve types: Pub-
lic, Public Foreign, Commercial, Community and Campus. The National Communications
Authority describes each of these types as follows. Commercial stations are those that are
privately owned, controlled and operated for prot by independent commercial groups or
individuals. Public stations are stations that are owned and operated by the Ghana Broad-
casting Corporation (GBC) or any other stations established by the Government of Ghana
while Public Foreign stations are stations established by foreign governments, such as the
BBC. Community stations are non-prot and provide service for a specic marginalized
community. Ownership and management of community stations are representative of
the community. Finally, Campus stations are stations operating within the ambit of ed-
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Figure 1·1: Number of authorized radio stations by license type since lib-
eralization.
ucational institutions. The license type is important because it determines how stations
can generate revenue, the permissible size of its coverage radius and the application fees,
initial fees and annual fees the stations must pay. In the entry model of this paper, I will
focus mostly on commercial radio stations since an overwhelming majority of the entry
the took place is from commercial stations. Figure 1·1 shows the cumulative entry of com-
mercial radio stations compared to other types. In 2016, there were over 350 authorized
commercial stations with 480 authorized stations overall. In per capita terms, the country
now has approximately one-third of the number of radio stations in the US.
For the most part, commercial radio stations are independently owned. Outside of
the public stations run by the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, 19 companies held two
broadcasting licenses and 6 companies held three broadcasting licenses. That leaves 296
independently-owned commercial stations. Since the opening of multiple stations rarely
occurs in the data I abstract away from network expansion in the structural model, as that
would increase the computational burden signicantly. There are a number of reasons
why multiple ownership is rare in the data. As a relatively young market, most stations
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have not yet grown enough to expand into multiple markets. This can also be exacerbated
by poor credit markets as opening multiple stations would require large startup funds.
Another reason is that Ghana’s markets are heterogeneous with many dierent languages
and ethnic groups.
Commercial stations are required to pay initial authorization fees and annual spec-
trum fees. Commercial stations and Public Foreign stations are restricted to have a 45km
coverage radius while Community and Campus stations are restricted to (approximately)
a 5km radius. Public stations, on the other hand, do not have any coverage limitations.
The coverage limitations on commercial stations may aect their entry decisions, which
will be explored in this paper.
1.3 Data
1.3.1 Radio Station Data
Data on the entry and exit of radio stations come from Ghana’s National Communica-
tions Authority (NCA). A convenient aspect of the radio broadcasting industry is that
the licensed radio stations need to be well documented so that stations with similar fre-
quencies in nearby areas do not overlap in their coverage areas. The NCA lists of all the
license holders which show all the authorization dates of license holders since the rst
authorizations in 1995. The NCA also have reports which document whether the stations
are currently “On Air” or “O Air” which are available from 2009Q3-2016Q31. This en-
ables me to observe entry and exit in the data at a quarterly frequency during this period.
Exit is rare in the data, so in the model I focus solely on the entry decisions of radio sta-
tions. I supplement this data with data from FMLIST, a worldwide radio station database.
These data contain various other information about the transmitters, such as their height
above ground, wattage and GPS coordinates. Missing information for stations on antenna
1Newer data have since become available and merging them is currently work in progress.
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height and transmitter power was imputed. Due to regulations on stations’ broadcasting
radii, these were mostly homogeneous. Some of the quarterly reports from the National
Communications Authority were also missing. However, for almost all radio stations, the
station was active before and after the missing period or inactive before and after.
I use the Longley and Rice (1968) Irregular Terrain Model to compute the eld strength
of each radio station’s coverage. I use the command-line tool SPLAT!2 (a radio frequency
Signal Propagation, Loss, And Terrain analysis tool) to perform these calculations. This
model was initially used by the Federal Communications Commission to predict the extent
of stations’ coverage areas to ensure that the coverage from stations with the same fre-
quency in dierent locations did not overlap. The model computes how the eld strength
of radio transmission degrades as the signal reaches obstructions such as hills and moun-
tains. For these obstructions, I use data from the Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (Farr
et al., 2007), which is a worldwide digital elevation model at three arc seconds (roughly
90m×90m).
Figure 1·2 shows an example of this calculation for one radio station. The left panel in
Figure 1·2 shows the elevation near the city of Kumasi in Ghana. Brighter areas represent
areas with higher elevation. The red point represents the location of one radio station’s
mast. The right panel in Figure 1·2 shows the signal strength of that radio station’s cov-
erage in the same area. The signal strength is measured in decibel-microvolts per meter
(dBµV/m). Bright green areas represent where the signal quality is high and blue areas
represent where the signal quality is very poor. As the signal reaches mountainous ob-
structions, the color darkens rapidly, indicating a sharp drop in signal quality. The Federal
Communications Commission, as well as other regulatory bodies around the world, con-
sider 60 dBµV/m to be the threshold of signal strength for FM radio broadcasting. In this
paper, I will also use the 60 dBµV/m cuto.
2More information is available here: https://github.com/jmcmellen/splat
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Figure 1·2: Example radio station coverage output. The left gure shows
the elevation in a particular area where the red point indicates the loca-
tion of a radio station’s mast. The right gure shows the computed sig-
nal strength of that radio station in the same area, measured in decibel-
microvolts per meter.
The resulting coverage data is at a 90m×90m resolution which results in several mil-
lion data points for each station. In order to merge this data with other data sources, I
aggregate to 30 arc seconds (as opposed to 3 arc seconds) which makes the resolution
approximately 900m×900m.
It should be noted that these coverage predictions are computed from a model and as
a result are not perfect. The elevation data does not take into account other obstructions,
such as forests and large buildings. Kasampalis, Lazaridis, Zaharis, Bizopoulos, Zettas, and
Cosmas (2013) perform a validation exercise comparing predictions of the model to actual
eld readings of eld strength. They nd that SPLAT! has an average error of -0.5 dBµV/m
and a standard deviation of 5.5 dBµV/m. Since 60 dBµV/m is considered the minimum
eld strength required for a station to be picked up, the average error is very small. I
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Figure 1·3: The log of the number of authorized stations available at each
point in Ghana at approximately 900m×900m resolution, 1995-2015.
also aggregate the data from 3 arc seconds to 30 arc seconds which would reduce this
error. I have also tested the SPLAT! software by computing the coverage areas of dierent
radio stations in the Greater Boston Area, using data from the Federal Communications
Commission. Using a simple portable FM radio, I found consistent coverage predictions
from the model.
Figure 1·3 shows the output from generating the coverage maps for every radio station.
The gure shows the log total number of authorized stations available at each point at ve-
year intervals at approximately 900m×900m resolution using the 60 dBµV/m coverage
threshold. This does not distinguish whether the station is commercial, public, community
or campus. There is a large variation in the number of stations across the country, as well
as large variation over time. The country’s capital Accra, the coastal city in the southeast,
has the most stations. The northern regions have very few stations, with many areas not
having any coverage even by the end of the data.
Malaria Incidence
One outcome of radio coverage I will examine is malaria incidence among children. Malaria
accounts for 33.4% of all deaths in children under ve years of age and 36% of health cen-
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Figure 1·4: Malaria incidence rate in 2-10 year olds over time. Data source:
Malaria Atlas Project.
ter admissions3. The Malaria Atlas Project (Bhatt et al., 2015) constructed detailed maps
of malaria incidence in Sub-Saharan Africa for the years 2000-2015 at a 15-arc second res-
olution. The maps are estimated using a geostatistical model which uses dierent survey
datasets and climate data. Figure 1·4 shows the malaria incidence rate in 2-10-year-olds
from 2000-2015. The incidence rate is high throughout most of the country, in particular
in earlier periods in the sample. Larger cities have a lower incidence rate and the incidence
rate is falling over time.
Nighttime Luminosity Data
Another outcome of radio coverage I will examine is nighttime luminosity as seen from
space. Night lights data have been used as proxies for local GDP in an ever-increasing
number of applications, for example, Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil (2011, 2012), Bleak-
ley and Lin (2012), Gennaioli, La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, and Shleifer (2013) and Michalopou-
los and Papaioannou (2013). These data come from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration. These are satellite images captured by the US Air Force at night between
3Source: http://defeatmalaria.org/ghana
13
8:30 PM and 10:00 PM local time around the world. These images are then processed
and cleaned to represent the average amount of light emanating from a geographic loca-
tion during a year. Observations obstructed by clouds are excluded, as well as observa-
tions with light coming from forest res, gas ares, sunlight (during summer months) and
moonlight. Night lights data are available from 1992-2013 at a 30-arc second resolution
around the world (approximately 900m×900m in Ghana). Values in the data are repre-
sented on a scale that ranges from 0 to 63 which measures the amount of light captured
by the camera’s sensor. This scale is top-coded at 63, although top-coding is rare in Ghana.
Only 0.04% and 0.14% of observations are top-coded in 1992 and 2013 respectively. For a
portion of the years available, data from two dierent satellites are available. In these
cases, I take averages across satellites. Figure 1·5 shows night lights in Ghana for 1993
and 2013.
Road Network Data
Distance to the nearest road will be a control variable in the reduced-form regressions.
I use road network data are from OpenStreetMap which are more detailed than other
readily-available administrative data as they contains smaller roads. However, these data
are not time-varying and only contain the present road network. The road network for
the country is shown in Figure A·1 and distance to the nearest road is shown in Figure A·2.
Demographic Health Survey Data
To further explore the eect of radio coverage on malaria incidence, I examine mosquito
bed net usage in the Demographic Health Survey (DHS) data. The DHS program has con-
ducted more than 300 surveys of population, health and nutrition in over 90 countries.
In Ghana, they have conducted six repeated cross sections from 1993 to 2016. However,
the questions vary year-by-year and information on mosquito bed net usage are only
14
Figure 1·5: Nighttime luminosity as seen from space in Ghana in 1993 (left)
and 2013 (right). The green outline represents Ghana’s national border.
Data source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.
contained in the surveys since 2003. The DHS provides approximate coordinates of each
survey cluster which allows matching with the coverage data. The survey cluster loca-
tions for each year are shown in Figure A·3. The surveys span most of the country but
some of the underpopulated areas are omitted. To preserve the anonymity of the survey
respondents, the DHS purposefully add an error of up to 2km for urban clusters and 5km
for rural clusters. Thus matching the coverage data with the DHS data on the coordinates
that they provide will introduce measurement error. To reduce this measurement error
I take the average amount of coverage available within a radius around the cluster loca-
tions, rather than taking the number of available radio stations at the latitude-longitude
pair given in the data. The radius I use for each survey cluster corresponds to the max-
imum possible error introduced by the DHS (2km for urban clusters and 5km for rural
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clusters).
Population Data
For the structural model, an important variable is the potential listenership of a radio
station. Population data at administrative areas ner than the district level are not read-
ily available for Ghana. However, NASA’s Socioeconomic Data and Applications Center
(SEDAC) provide rasterized population estimates at a 30 arc second resolution (approx-
imately 900m×900m) (Balk, Deichmann, Yetman, Pozzi, Hay, and Nelson, 2006). These
maps were constructed using administrative data at the district and town level and satel-
lite and road data were used to estimate the urban extent of the cities. Unfortunately,
these population rasters are only available for 1990, 1995 and 2000. I create a population
raster for 2010 using a similar methodology to that used by NASA SEDAC. I rst obtain
district-level population counts from the 2000 and 2010 census from the Ghana Statisti-
cal Service. A number of districts in Ghana split or merged between 2000 and 2010 so in
these cases I merge districts to remain consistent between years4. Then, using a shapele
of Ghana’s districts5, I rasterize the district populations in both years to be comparable
to the population raster. I also use 2000 and 2010 night lights data. To smooth out mea-
surement error in the night lights data I use the average of 1999-2001 and 2009-2011 as
proxies for 2000 and 2010 respectively. I then t a LASSO model predicting the values
of each cell in the 2000 population raster using 2000 census data, 2000 night lights, the
1990 population raster and their interactions and higher-order terms. I then predict a 2010
population raster using the estimated model with the updated predictors. The resulting
population raster produces aggregate counts and growth rates similar to the census g-
ures at the district level. Maps of log population are shown in Figure A·4. To obtain values
4The history of Ghana’s district splits and merges are available at:
http://www.statoids.com/ygh.html
5Available at http://gadm.org/
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for population before and after 2010 I interpolate and extrapolate linearly using the 2000
and 2010 values.
1.4 Health and Economic Outcomes of Radio Coverage
1.4.1 Identication Strategy
Radio coverage is not randomly assigned throughout the country, as stations may prefer
to locate in areas with higher population and less competition. However, irregular terrain
creates some randomness in radio coverage which can be exploited. Consider Figure 1·6a
which shows the coverage area for a radio station in a Sekondi-Takoradi. This city has
a population of approximately half a million people and the coverage area of the station
encompasses the city and some surrounding areas. As a result of hills away from the
station, the coverage stops abruptly in certain areas. However, there are some gaps in the
hills which allows some “streaks” of coverage to spill through into some rural areas. Given
the population living in these streaks is a small fraction of the station’s main coverage area
in the city, I argue that the station is not positioning its radio mast strategically to include
certain areas beyond the hills. If we believe that the locations of these streaks of coverage
are random, then we can use a geographic regression discontinuity design and compare
outcomes on either side of the borders of these streaks. These coverage streaks appear for
many radio stations. With all radio stations together, there are many locations throughout
the country that receive coverage in an as-if random fashion.
1.4.2 Implementation
I discretize the country into a grid with a resolution of 30 arc seconds. Each tile in the grid
has a resolution of approximately 900m×900m. Each observation is then a tile-year. The
task is to identify tiles which are near the border of a coverage streak in a particular year. I
systematically identify coverage streaks as follows. First, for every station, I nd the ratio
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(a) Example radio station coverage map. The identication strat-
egy compares outcomes in locations near the borders of “coverage
streaks”, which are caused by gaps in mountainous areas.
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
Coverage-Land Ratio
(b) Identifying coverage streaks. For each
station, I compute the ratio of coverage to
land at distance bins away from the station.
Coverage streaks occur when the coverage-
land ratio is suciently low.
Non-random coverage Random coverage
(c) Areas included in the design are areas
where (i) the coverage-land ratio is low, (ii)
the coverage is far away from the near-
est transmitter and (iii) nearby elevation
changes are small. Estimation compares
outcomes on the border between the dark
areas and the white areas.
Figure 1·6: Identication strategy for the geographic regression disconti-
nuity.
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of coverage to land at distance bins away from the transmitter. I call this the coverage-
land ratio. This is shown in Figure 1·6b. Tiles very close to the station have a ratio of one
because all tiles with land at those distances have coverage. Further away, however, the
ratio falls as some coverage gets blocked by hills. I identify streaks of coverage where the
ratio of coverage to land is below some threshold.
It is also possible that the coverage-land ratio is small near the source of coverage. In
these cases, the station may have intended for coverage to reach those locations. Therefore
we only want to include tiles that are far away from the station. I only include areas
that are in the upper quintile of distance away from the station and at least 10km from
the nearest transmitter. Figure 1·6c shows an example of the random part of a station’s
coverage area: tiles where the coverage-land ratio is less than 0.2 and the distance from
the transmitter is in the outer quintile. The tiles that will get included in the regression
discontinuity are the tiles near the border of these outer coverage streaks.
The elevation change causing the coverage streak should also be far away from a
location, as local elevation changes may aect outcomes directly. Therefore I exclude
locations with elevation changes exceeding fty meters in a 9km×9km grid around the
observation. Finally, it is possible a location is in near a coverage streak of one station but
in the immediate (non-random) coverage area of a dierent station. Only locations near
coverage streaks that are not in the immediate coverage of other stations are included.
The estimating equation is then:
y`,t+τ − y`t = β × coveraдe`t + x′`tγ + f (d`t ) + ε`t
The dependent variable is the change an outcome of interest. coveraдe`t is an indicator
for whether that tile had radio coverage and x`t is a vector of control variables. d`t is the
distance to the nearest coverage streak border and f (·) is a exible polynomial of positive
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and negative negative values of d`t . One control variable is a measure of hilliness which
is the maximum elevation change (at a 90m×90m resolution) in a 9km×9km grid around
the observation. Since coverage spills through gaps in hills, it is also possible that roads
also follow the path through gaps in the hills. Therefore I also include a polynomial of
distance to the nearest road as a control in some specications.
1.4.3 Outcome Variables
For this identication strategy, it is necessary to have outcome data at a very ne geo-
graphic resolution, as only a small proportion of the country will be close to a coverage
streak. One dataset at a ne geographic resolution is the malaria incidence rate among
children aged 2-10 from the Malaria Atlas Project (Bhatt et al., 2015). News programs and
“edutainment” programs on the radio can inform individuals about how to avoid contract-
ing malaria. According to those surveyed in the Demographic Health Surveys in 2003,
2008 and 2014, 80% stated they heard messages about malaria on the radio. For television
and newspapers, this number was 52% and 15% respectively.
Another outcome variable I can use is nighttime luminosity from space, which rep-
resents a catch-all for development in the area. Individuals may learn about improved
farming practices or employment opportunities, which can increase growth in the area.
1.4.4 Results
Table 1.1 shows the results for the change in malaria incidence among children aged 2-10
over a ve-year period. Column (1) shows the results using the full sample of data. We can
see that areas that receive radio coverage experience a larger drop in malaria incidence of
2.3 percentage points, where the malaria incidence rate is falling by 7.4 percentage points
on average. Columns (2) to (5) show the results using only observations near the border
of coverage streaks. Specically, these observations are within 1km of a random coverage
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Dependent variable:
Change in Malaria Incidence Over Five Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coverage −0.023∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗ −0.014∗ −0.014∗∗ −0.014∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Mean dependent variable −0.074 −0.078 −0.078 −0.078 −0.078
Close to random coverage only No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance to cuto polynomials No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Road controls No No Yes No Yes
Elevation controls No No No Yes Yes
Observations 3,059,650 189,802 189,802 189,802 189,802
?p < 0.1, ??p < 0.05, ???p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the district level (137 districts).
The dependent variable is the change in malaria incidence rate among 2-10 year olds over ve years.
The independent variable, Coverage, is an indicator for whether or not the tile has coverage from any
radio station in that year. Column (1) contains the full sample. Observations included in columns
(2)-(5) are within 1km of a random coverage border, where random coverage is dened as (i) having
a coverage-land ratio of less than 0.2, (ii) being in the outer quintile of a station’s coverage (iii) being
at least 10km from the nearest station and (iv) having a maximum elevation change of 50m (at a
90m×90m resolution) within a within a 9km×9km grid surrounding the observation.
Table 1.1: Geographic regression discontinuity results for changes in
malaria incidence.
border, where random coverage is dened as (i) having a coverage-land ratio of less than
0.2, (ii) being in the outer quintile of a station’s coverage (iii) being at least 10km from
the nearest station and (iv) having a maximum elevation change of 50m (at a 90m×90m
resolution) within a within a 9km×9km grid surrounding the observation. Columns (2)-(5)
dier only in which road and elevation variables are included. The coecient on coverage
is almost identical across Columns (2)-(5) and is smaller in magnitude compared to the full
sample in Column (1). One reason for the full sample having a larger magnitude is that
stations prefer to locate in urban areas, which generally do not satisfy the conditions to
be included in the regression discontinuity sample. In urban areas, individuals may learn
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Dependent variable:
Change in Nighttime Luminosity over Five Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coverage 0.144∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.011∗∗ 0.012∗∗ 0.011∗∗
(0.030) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Mean dependent variable 0.127 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015
Close to random coverage only No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Distance to cuto polynomials No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Road controls No No Yes No Yes
Elevation controls No No No Yes Yes
Observations 4,730,063 217,713 217,713 217,713 217,713
?p < 0.1, ??p < 0.05, ???p < 0.01. Standard errors are clustered at the district level (137 districts). The
dependent variable is the change in night lights over ve years. The independent variable, Coverage,
is an indicator for whether or not the tile has coverage from any radio station in that year. Column (1)
contains the full sample. Observations included in columns (2)-(5) are within 1km of a random coverage
border, where random coverage is dened as (i) having a coverage-land ratio of less than 0.2, (ii) being
in the outer quintile of a station’s coverage (iii) being at least 10km from the nearest station and (iv)
having a maximum elevation change of 50m (at a 90m×90m resolution) within a within a 9km×9km
grid surrounding the observation.
Table 1.2: Geographic regression discontinuity results for changes in
night lights.
how to avoid contracting malaria from other sources, biasing the coecient away from
zero.
Table 1.2 presents the regression results using the change in night lights over a ve-
year period as the dependent variable. Areas receiving radio coverage may learn about
more productive practices, such as better farming methods, and therefore grow faster
than areas not receiving coverage. Column (1) shows the full sample where coverage is
positively correlated with night lights growth. Columns (2)-(5) show the results using
only observations near the borders of coverage streaks, with dierent road and elevation
controls. Again, the coecients do not vary signicantly when we include or exclude
dierent controls, but the magnitude is much smaller compared to the full sample. We
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expect the bias in the full sample to be positive because stations prefer to locate in areas
that are expected to grow faster over time.
Using Ghana’s aggregate GDP values (in constant 2010 US dollars from the World
Bank) together with the aggregate sum of nighttime luminosity values for the country,
one unit of night lights in one 900m×900m cell represents a local GDP of approximately
$145,000. Therefore cells that receive coverage on average experience an increase in local
GDP of $1,740 over a ve-year period. While this number seems low, GDP PPP per capita
is currently $4,650 and the population density in coverage streaks tends to be lower than
the rest of the country.
1.4.5 Robustness
In Table 1.3 I present various robustness checks. For the identication strategy, radio
stations should not be strategically placing their masts in order to capture particular areas
in their coverage streaks. One way to check for this is to regress the initial value of
night lights on coverage for areas near coverage streaks. If stations were strategically
placing their masts to capture particular towns in the fringe of their coverage streaks,
then the coecient should be positive and statistically signicant. Using the same sample
restrictions as before, Column (1) regresses initial night lights on the indicator for radio
coverage. We can see that there is no signicant dierence between initial night lights
on either side of the coverage streak, indicating that stations are not strategically placing
their masts in order to capture particular areas near the coverage streaks.
Column (2) show a balance test for the range of elevation in a 9km×9km grid at a
90m×90m resolution. Since the sample was chosen to omit areas where it was hilly nearby,
there is no signicant dierence by construction. Column (3) shows a balance test for
distance to the nearest road. Again, there is no signicant dierence.
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Dependent variable:
Initial Night Lights Elevation range Distance to Nearest Road
(1) (2) (3)
Coverage 0.006 −0.572 −0.201
(0.005) (0.411) (0.178)
Mean dependent variable 0.015 27.568 3.054
Close to random coverage only Yes Yes Yes
Distance to cuto polynomials Yes Yes Yes
Observations 313,326 313,641 313,641
?p < 0.1, ??p < 0.05, ???p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the district level (137 districts).
The dependent variable in column (1) is the value of nighttime luminosity in 1992. The depen-
dent variable in column (2) is the dierence between the highest and lowest elevation value (at a
90m×90m resolution) in a 9km×9km grid surrounding the observations. The dependent variable
in column (3) is the distance to nearest road (in km) using OpenStreetMap data. The independent
variable, Coverage, is an indicator for whether or not the tile has coverage from any radio station
in that year. Observations included are within 1km of a random coverage border, where random
coverage is dened as (i) having a coverage-land ratio of less than 0.2, (ii) being in the outer
quintile of a station’s coverage (iii) being at least 10km from the nearest station and (iv) having a
maximum elevation change of 50m (at a 90m×90m resolution) within a within a 9km×9km grid
surrounding the observation.
Table 1.3: Robustness checks for the geographic regression discontinuity.
1.4.6 Demographic Health Survey Data
To explore the mechanism behind the eect of radio coverage on malaria incidence I use
Demographic Health Survey (DHS) data. I cannot implement the geographic regression
discontinuity identication strategy using these data for two reasons. The DHS pur-
posefully introduce error in the geographic coordinates of the survey cluster locations
in order to preserve the anonymity of respondents. In rural areas, this error can be as
large as 5km. Furthermore, there are too few survey clusters that would be near cover-
age streaks. Therefore I must employ an alternative identication strategy. One possible
strategy would be to use local elevation as an instrument for coverage as elevation is
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negatively correlated with radio coverage. However, using such an instrument would be
problematic if elevation aects outcomes directly. For example, areas that are hilly are
more disconnected from society and as result obtain less information from other villages.
To side-step this problem I use distant hilliness as an instrument. The motivation is as
follows. Local elevation aects the amount of radio coverage a village receives, but the
elevation far away from the village also aects the amount of coverage. This is because it
does not matter if the obstruction between the radio tower and the village is closer to the
village or further away nearer to the radio tower. However, the distant elevation from the
village is less likely to aect the village directly compared to local elevation. Therefore I
use distant hilliness to instrument for coverage.
With this strategy, I construct the instrument as follows. I draw two circles around
each cluster location in the DHS data with radii 10km and 15km respectively. These two
circles form a ring. I then take the standard deviation of elevation values within the ring
as a measure of distant hilliness. Figure 1·7 shows an example ring around a survey cluster
on top of an elevation heatmap.
Table 1.4 shows the regression results. Since coverage only varies at the cluster-year
level, I aggregate the data to that level and use robust standard errors. The rst column
shows the results from an ordinary least squares regression of percentage of households
where children use a mosquito bed net on radio station coverage. I control for year xed
eects, region xed eects and a host of demographic controls. I also control for local
malaria presence using the average incidence within a 5km radius of the survey cluster.
Coverage increases the probability of mosquito bed net usage on average by about 4.2%.
The second column shows the results from the rst stage of the instrumental variables
regression. The standard deviation of elevation in the ring around the survey cluster has
a strong negative eect on coverage. In the instrumental variables regression, coverage
on average increases the probability of mosquito bed net usage by 16.9%. One possible
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Figure 1·7: Example ring
around a survey cluster over-
laid on an elevation heatmap
(measured in meters). The in-
strument for coverage is the
standard deviation of elevation
within the ring.
Children Coverage Children
sleep from any sleep
under commercial under
bed net station bed net
OLS OLS IV
(1) (2) (3)
Coverage from 0.042?? 0.169??
commercial station (0.020) (0.072)
SD of elevation in −0.003???
ring around cluster (0.000)
Demographic controls Yes Yes Yes
Region Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
N 1142 1142 1142
Adjusted R2 0.389 0.504
F -statistic 25.243 39.608
??? p < 0.01, ?? p < 0.05, ? p < 0.1.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Data is collapsed at the sur-
vey cluster-year level. Demographic controls include gender, age,
education attainment, religion, ethnicity, literacy, newspaper read-
ership, television viewership, urban/rural. Local malaria presence
is also controlled for using Malaria Atlas Project data.
Table 1.4: Instrumental variable regressions us-
ing standard deviation of elevation within a ring
around survey cluster as an instrument for FM
coverage.
explanation for the higher coecient in the instrumental variable regression compared
to ordinary least squares is measurement error in coverage, resulting from the built-in
error in DHS survey cluster coordinates.
This result supports the geographic regression discontinuity results in Table 1.1 and
provides a supporting mechanism. Areas receiving radio coverage are informed of ways
to reduce the risk of malaria, which is partly a result of increased bed net usage among
children.
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1.5 A Model of Radio Station Entry
With estimates of the positive eects of radio coverage on health and economic outcomes,
we are now interested in how regulation and competition aect the entry decisions of
commercial radio stations. I study this using a dynamic structural model of radio station
entry. A dynamic structural model is necessary because the entry decisions of stations are
complex, involving many dynamic and strategic interactions. In particular, whether or not
a radio station enters today may aect the entry decisions of its rivals in the future. A
static model would not be able to capture the preemptive incentives of the radio stations.
In this section, I present a model based on previous models in the estimation of dynamic
games literature. I adapt the model to include features of this industry.
1.5.1 Model Setup
Each player i ∈ N = {1, . . . ,N } is a commercial radio station. Players are endowed with
a xed location denoted by coordinates (x ,y) which are distributed across various points
in the country. Endowing players with a location rather than allowing them to choose a
location is made for computational reasons during estimation. The life cycle of a radio
station is illustrated in Figure 1·8. Players begin as potential entrants with no broadcasting
license. In each period t , a potential entrant can choose to obtain a broadcasting license
or stay out of the market. Call the set of actions ait ∈ A = {0, 1}, where ait = 0 denotes
staying out of the market and ait = 1 denotes obtaining a broadcasting license. If they
choose to obtain a license, stations pay an entry cost and then must wait a setup time
before they can begin broadcasting. There is some uncertainty as to how long the setup
time is: each period after authorization, there is a probability λ that they are ready to
begin broadcasting. This is motivated by the fact that stations do not immediately begin
broadcasting in the data. Some stations begin broadcasting a few months after authoriza-
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1 Potential Entrant (unauthorized)
1 Stay out 2 Become authorized
2 Remain inactive 3 Become active
3 Stay active 4 Become inactive/Exit
ait = 0 ait = 1
1 − λ λ
1 − κ κ
Figure 1·8: Life cycle of a radio station in the model. Potential entrants
can choose to become authorized, ait = 1, or stay out, ait = 0. After autho-
rization, stations pay an entry cost θEC and wait a setup time. The proba-
bility the station completes setup each period is λ. Actively-broadcasting
stations earn prots pii (st ,θ ), which depend on the market state, st , and
the structural parameters, θ . When the station becomes active there is an
exogenous probability κ each period that it becomes inactive. If the station
exits it earns a payo of zero and cannot reenter.
tion while others can take two years to begin. Only actively-broadcasting stations earn
prots. Finally, once the radio station is actively broadcasting it may shut down and exit
the market. Exit is not a choice for the station, but rather happens exogenously each pe-
riod at an arrival rate κ. This assumption is made because exit is very rare in the data.
There are also P potential public radio stations which can enter at dierent points in the
country in a similar manner.
Let st ∈ S ⊆ RS denote the market state at time t , where S is the number of dierent
state variables. The state variables include which potential entrants have licenses, their
coverage maps, the population at each point in the country and the current year.
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1.5.2 Payos
Each period, potential entrants receive action-specic private information shocks, ν0it and
ν1it , which are unobservable to rival stations, whereν it =
(
ν0it ,ν
1
it
) ∈ V ⊆ R2. For potential
entrants choosing to stay out of the market, this can be interpreted as the entrant’s outside
option. For potential entrants choosing to enter, this can be interpreted as a shock to entry
costs. These private information shocks are assumed to follow a Type I extreme value
distribution. Actively-broadcasting stations’ prots will depend on the market state and
a vector of structural parameters, pii (st ,θ ). The prot function is parameterized as:
pi (st ,θ ) = θMMit + θCCit + θPPit + θT t
Mit is a measure of the population within the station’s coverage area. Cit and Pit are
measures of the competition facing the station from rival commercial stations and public
stations respectively. Stations who exit earn a payo of zero.
Coverage Areas
To measure the payos for each station, we need to dene their coverage areas. Let
f
dBµV /m
it (x ,y) be the eld strength in decibel microvolts per meter of station i’s cover-
age at coordinates (x ,y). Higher values of f dBµV /mit (x ,y) indicate that that the listening
quality of the station is higher at that point. f dBµV /mit (x ,y) = 0 indicates either that sta-
tion i is either o air at time t or that its signal does not reach that point. For simplicity,
instead of using this continuous measure of eld strength, I use a cuto eld strength of
60 dBµ V/m where for all x ,y such that f dBµV /mit (x ,y) ≥ 60 there is coverage from station
i and no coverage otherwise. The FCC uses the 60 dBµV/m cuto for frequency planning
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purposes, as well as other regulatory agencies. Therefore I dene:
fit (x ,y) =

1 if f dBµ/mit (x ,y) ≥ 60
0 otherwise
Using a cuto rather than a continuous measure is natural to some degree. People will
only listen to a station if its quality is above some acceptable level that makes it under-
standable.
Market Size
Let pt (x ,y) be the population density at (x ,y) at time t . I measure market size for rm i
at time t as:
Mit = log
©­«
+180∫
−180
+90∫
−90
fit (x ,y)pt (x ,y)dydxª®¬
This measure gives the log of the total population within rm i’s coverage area. This is
the total potential listenership of the station. An example of this calculation is shown in
Figure 1·9. The rst panel shows a station’s coverage area where each pixel equals one if
there is coverage and zero otherwise. The second panel shows the population density of
each pixel in the same area. The third panel then multiplies the rst two gures together.
The market size variable is then found by taking the sum of all the pixel values in the
third panel and taking the log.
Competition
Station i competes with other stations only if their coverage areas overlap. Two stations
compete more intensely with one another the more their coverage areas overlap. To mea-
sure competition for a station, I sum the share of overlap with every other radio station.
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Figure 1·9: Example calculation of market size within a rm’s coverage
area. The rst panel shows a radio station’s coverage area. In the second
panel, the population density of the same area is shown. The third panel
multiplies the two gures together. The market size measure is then found
by summing all the pixels in the third panel.
This is calculated according to:
Cit =
∑
j∈N\{i}
∫ +180
−180
∫ +90
−90 fit (x ,y) fjt (x ,y)dydx∫ +180
−180
∫ +90
−90 fit (x ,y)dydx
If there are only two stations and they overlap one-for-one, the competition measure is 1.
If there are only two stations and each overlap by 50%, the competition measure is 0.5. If
there are three stations and one station overlaps another one-for-one and another 50%, the
competition measure is 1.56. An example of this calculation for one station in the case of
two rivals is shown in Figure 1·10. The left gure shows the coverage areas of the example
station and rival A. The two stations are approximately 43km away from each other and
there is a stretch of mountains in between them. Therefore their coverage areas hardly
overlap and the overlap share is zero. The right gure shows the coverage areas of the
6In practiceCit is calculated as follows. Let M be the overlap matrix where M i j is what proportion of i’s
coverage area is covered by j’s coverage area. Let a be a vector which indicates which stations are actively
broadcasting. Then the vector of competition measures for each rm is {Cit }i ∈N = Ma − a.
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Example station
Rival station A
Example station's overlap share with rival A: 0.00
Example station
Rival station B
Example station's overlap share with rival B: 0.52
Example A: Not Competing Example B: Competing
Example Station's Coverage Only Rival Station's Coverage Only Coverage Overlap
Figure 1·10: Examples of calculating the competition variable. In Exam-
ple A, the example station does not overlap with Rival A due to hills in
between them, resulting in an overlap share of zero. In Example B, the ex-
ample station overlaps with Rival B 52%. The competition measure for the
example station is the sum of the overlap shares with all rivals.
example station and rival B. Rival B is approximately 7km from the example station and
their coverage areas mostly overlap. Rival B covers 52% of the example station’s coverage
area. The competition measure for the example station is the sum of the overlap shares
with all rival stations, in this case 0.52. It should be noted that overlap shares are not
symmetric across stations, and they depend on the size of the station’s coverage area. For
example, the example station above covers approximately 73% of rival B’s coverage area.
Competition with public stations is dened analogously. I ignore competition from
campus and community stations because those stations have very small coverage areas
due to their limitation on transmitter strength.
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1.5.3 Value Function
Station i’s ex-ante expected present discounted value from entering is:
V 1i (st ,θ ) = −θEC +
∞∑
τ=1
(1 − λ)τ−1 λβτ
∞∑
s=0
βs (1 − κ)s E [pii (st+τ+s ,θ ) |st ]
Entering requires paying the sunk cost of entry, θEC , plus receiving the expected dis-
counted value of prots into the future. Recall λ is the probability the station nishes its
setup time each period. The rst sum over τ is the weighted sum over each period the
station could begin earning prots the future, weighted by the probability that the station
starts earning prots in that period. β ∈ [0, 1) is the discount factor. When the station
begins earning prots, the discount factor is scaled by the exogenous probability of exit,
κ.
If the station does not enter, the station will have the choice to enter or not in the
following period. Therefore the ex-ante value of not entering today is the expected value
of the maximum of the values of entering or not entering in the following period:
V 0i (st ,θ ) = βE
[
max
{
E
[
V 0i (st+1,θ )
 st ] + ν0it+1,E [V 1i (st+1,θ ) st ] + ν1it+1}]
= β log
(
exp
(
E
[
V 0i (st+1,θ )
 st ] ) + exp (E [V 1i (st+1,θ ) st ] ) )
Here I use the assumption that the private information shocks are distributed with a Type
I extreme value distribution. It is optimal for a station to enter today if
V 1i (st ,θ ) + ν1it ≥ V 0i (st ,θ ) + ν0it
The ex-ante probability of entry is:
Pr (ait = 1|sit ) =
exp
(
V 1i (st ,θ )
)
exp
(
V 0i (st ,θ )
)
+ exp
(
V 1i (st ,θ )
)
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1.5.4 Strategies and Equilibrium
Following the literature on the estimation of dynamic games, the equilibrium notion used
in this game is Markov Perfection. Call σi : S × V → A rm i’s Markov strategy.
This strategy is a function which maps the current market state and the rm’s private
information shocks into an action. Let σ = {σi}i∈N be a prole of Markov strategies. We
say that the strategy prole σ is part of a Markov Perfect Equilibrium if for all players i
such that σi (st ,νit ) = 0 we have that:
V 0i (σ , st ,θ ) + ν0it ≥ V 1i (σ−i , st ,θ ) + ν1it
and for all players i such that σi (st ,νit ) = 1 we have that:
V 1i (σ , st ,θ ) + ν1it ≥ V 0i (σ−i , st ,θ ) + ν0it
where σ−i is the Markov strategy prole for all players other than i . That is, no rm has
an incentive to unilaterally deviate from their current strategy given the other players
play according to σ .
1.6 Estimation
1.6.1 Potential Entrant Locations
The game is played by N players which consist of the stations observed in the data, as well
as the hypothetical potential entrants who never chose enter. Ideally, there would be a
potential entrant at every location where a station could conceivably enter, such as every
settled town in the country. I take the locations of every station observed in the data,
as well as an extra potential entrant in every settlement in the country. To locate these
settled areas, I rst nd clusters of night lights using the latest period of night lights data.
There are 256 of these clusters. I add one potential entrant to the centroid of these clusters.
34
These clusters and their centroids are shown in Figure A·5a. In Figure A·5b shows all the
potential entrants in the model, which are the radio stations in the data and the centroids
of the night lights clusters combined. Many of the new potential entrants are very close to
existing radio stations. However, a number are quite distant from existing radio stations.
These are towns and villages that never received a radio station. In total there are 608
players throughout the country.
1.6.2 Two-Step Estimation
Estimation of the structural parameters relies on the assumption that players are behaving
optimally. With this assumption, the Markov strategy prole σ is the prole of strategies
that we observe in the data. Given structural parameters θ , for each observation we need
to simulate the value function for the choice that the rm made in the data, V ai (σ , st ,θ ),
and the value function for the choice they did not make, while all other rms play accord-
ing to the strategy, V 1−ai (σ−i , st ,θ ).
Simulating the value function is computationally costly. Therefore I follow Bajari et al.
(2007) and exploit that fact that using a payo function that is linear in the structural
parameters implies that the value function is linear in the parameters. To see this, rst
dene ςit to indicate which stage in the lifecycle the rm is in:
ςit =

1 if station is unauthorized
2 if station is authorized but not yet active
3 if station is active
4 if station exited
With this, we can write the payo of a rm at any point in the life cycle as a linear function
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of the parameters:
p˜ii (st ,ν it ,θ ) = ν0it1 {ςit = 1} +
[
ν1it − θEC
]
1 {ςit = 2, ςit−1 = 1} +
[θMMit + θCCit + θPPit + θT t]1 {ςit = 3}
= Ψi (st ,ν it )θ
where θ = (θEC ,θM ,θC ,θP ,θT , 1) and
Ψi (st ,ν it ) = (−1 {ςit = 2, ςit−1 = 1} ,1 {ςit−1 = 3}Mit ,1 {ςit−1 = 3}Cit ,1 {ςit−1 = 3} Pit ,
1 {ςit−1 = 3} t ,ν0it1 {ςit = 1} + ν1it1 {ςit = 2, ςit−1 = 1}
)
Ψi (st ,ν it ) does not depend on the structural parameters θ . Therefore the value function
from pursuing the action chosen in the data becomes:
V ai (σ , st ,θ ) = E
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t p˜ii (sτ ,ν iτ ,θ )
σ , st
]
= E
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tΨi (sτ ,ν iτ )θ
σ , st
]
= E
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tΨi (sτ ,ν iτ )
σ , st
]
︸                                ︷︷                                ︸
≡W ai (σ ,st )
θ
Similarly, the value function for the rm when it deviates while all other rms continue
according to σ is
V 1−ait (σ−i , st ,θ ) =W 1−ai (σ−i , st )θ
The equilibrium denition can then be rewritten as:
[
W ai (σ , st ) −W 1−ai (σ−i , st )
]
θ ≥ 0 ∀i,∀t
By linearizing the value function this way we now only need to estimateW ait (σ , st ) and
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W 1−ait (σ−i , st ) once, rather than for each trial value of the structural parameters θ .
1.6.3 SimulatingW ai (σ , st ) andW 1−ai (σ−i , st )
To estimateW i (σ , st ), we rst need to choose a number of periods to simulate forward,
T , high enough such that it approximates innity well, given the chosen discount rate.
I use β = 0.9 and T = 50. With β = 0.9, the rst 50 periods makes up 99.54% of the
present value of an innite stream of constant values. In order to form the expectation
in the value function, I simulate forward many times with many dierent random draws
and take the average. With P simulations, the estimator ofW ait (σ , st ) is then:
Ŵ
a
it (σ , st ) =
1
P
P∑
p=1
t+T∑
τ=t
βτ−tΨai
(
sτp,ν iτp
)
I use P = 200 as forward simulation is computationally intensive and also since estimation
needs to be run multiple times to obtain standard errors. At τ = 0, the components of
Ψai
(
sτp,ν iτp
)
are computed directly from the data. Future values of Ψai
(
sτp,ν iτp
)
come
from simulation. The estimator ofW 1−ai (σ−i , st ) is analogously dened as:
Ŵ
1−a
i (σ−i , st ) =
1
P
P∑
p=1
t+T∑
τ=t
βτ−tΨ1−ai
(
sτp,ν iτp
)
At τ = 0, Ψ1−ai
(
sτp,ν iτp
)
diers from Ψai
(
sτp,ν iτp
)
in that we deviate rm i’s action at
time t . Future values of Ψ1−ai
(
sτp,ν iτp
)
will depend on rm i’s deviation and on other
rms’ reactions to this deviation.
To simulate the components of Ψai
(
sτp,ν iτp
)
and Ψ1−ai
(
sτp,ν iτp
)
forward I use num-
ber of rst-stage reduced-form estimates. The population at each 30-arc second grid is
assumed to continue to grow exogenously at the rate observed in the data, with normally
distributed shocks. To obtain the probability of a station entering given the current mar-
ket state, I use a logit model from the observed entry decisions. To estimate the exogenous
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probability of becoming active each period after becoming authorized, I t the observed
transitions to a Poisson distribution. To estimate the exogenous probability of exit, I take
the average exit rate observed in the data. Finally, the entry decisions of public radio
stations are assumed to be known in advance. This nal assumption is made because
plans for the entry of regional public stations are made public in advance (Heath, 2001).
Furthermore, there is very little entry of public stations during this study period.
For one simulated path, p, a sequence
{
Ψai
(
sτp,ν iτp
)}t+T
τ=t
for each observation starting
from time period t in the data can be obtained as follows:
Step 1: Calculate the probability of each station moving forward in their life cycle and
take random draws using those probabilities.
Step 2: Simulate population and public station entry forward.
Step 3: Recalculate the market size and competition variables for each station.
Step 4: Compute the elements of Ψai
(
sτp,ν iτp
)
for each player i ∈ N .
Step 5: Repeat steps 1-4 for T periods incrementing τ .
The steps for each sequence of
{
Ψ1−ai
(
sτp,ν iτp
)}t+T
τ=t
are similar except at period t we devi-
ate rm i’s action from what we observe in the data. Therefore calculating Ŵ
1−a
i (σ−i , st )
is more computationally intensive as this needs to be done separately for every observa-
tion.
One complication with this approach is as follows. If station A only overlaps with
station B, but station B overlaps with both station A and C, then station A indirectly
competes with station C. In the model, many of the radio stations indirectly compete
with one another. Figure A·6 shows networks of the radio stations for various cutos of
overlaps. If I dene a connection as having at least 10% or 25% overlap, the majority of
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stations are indirectly connected with each other. To ease computation when calculating
Ŵ
1−a
i (σ−i , st ), I only track reactions of stations near the deviating rm. Specically, I
track the reactions up to and including two nodes away from the station. I do this because
it is unlikely a deviation is unlikely to spill all the way through the network.
1.6.4 Second Stage
Once we have obtained the estimatesŴ
a
i (σ , st ) andŴ
1−a
i (σ−i , st ) from the rst stage for
every observation, we know the value functions for any trial parameter vector θ . Since
the private information shocks follow a Type I extreme value distribution, the probability
that observation (i, t) chooses the action observed in the data given the parameter vector
θ is:
Pr (ait | θ ) =
exp
(
Ŵ
a
i (σ , st )θ
)
exp
(
Ŵ
a
i (σ , st )θ
)
+ exp
(
Ŵ
1−a
i (σ−i , st )θ
)
I use maximize likelihood to estimate θ :
θ̂ = argmax
θ
1
NT
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
log (Pr (ait | θ ))
Standard errors using the Hessian of the likelihood do not take into account simulation
error in Ŵ
a
i (σ , st ) and Ŵ
1−a
i (σ−i , st ). Therefore I obtain condence intervals by draw-
ing subsamples of complete histories of clusters of nearby stations and re-estimating the
model. I partition the network of radio stations using the community walktrap algorithm
developed by Pons and Latapy (2005). This algorithm nds clusters of stations by simu-
lating many random walks between stations in the network, using the share of overlap
between stations to calculate the probabilities. This algorithm results in 25 separate clus-
ters shown in Figure A·7. I take many draws of 12 of these 25 clusters, weighted by the
number of observations in each cluster, and re-estimate the model to obtain standard er-
rors.
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1.6.5 Identication
There are ve parameters to be identied: the entry cost parameter, and the eects of
market size, competition (commercial and public) and the time trend. I cannot identify a
xed cost parameter as there is very little exit in the data. Without exit, the entry cost and
the xed cost are not separately identied as the entry cost without exit can be interpreted
as an annuity of the xed cost. Since population facing one station in a location does
not vary substantially over time, the population parameter is identied through cross-
sectional variation in population. The competition parameters are identied through the
timing of stations’ entry decisions. Two nearby stations at a particular location have
similar expectations about the evolution of the state variables. If one station enters in
one period, and they other chooses not to enter in the following years, this captures the
deterrent eects of competition. The time trend parameter is identied through greater
overall entry in later time periods in the data.
1.7 Structural Model Results
1.7.1 First Stage Results
Table 1.5 shows the results from a reduced-form logit regression of the entry decision on
lagged values of the state variables. I show multiple specications with and without region
xed eects, year xed eects and a time trend. The coecient estimates correspond
with prior expectations and are mostly robust across specications. Stations are more
likely to enter in more populated locations and less likely to enter in locations with more
competition from rival commercial stations. The time trend is positive, corresponding to
larger amounts of entry in the later years of the sample. This regression is used in the
forward simulation algorithm to calculate rms’ reactions to the actions of their rivals. In
the forward simulation, I use specication (2) which includes region xed eects but uses
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Dependent variable:
Entered this period (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log Population 0.162?? 0.140? 0.164?? 0.131
(0.080) (0.083) (0.082) (0.086)
Commercial Competition −0.025 −0.056??? −0.033? −0.064???
(0.017) (0.020) (0.018) (0.021)
Public Competition 0.126? 0.213?? 0.174?? 0.276??
(0.074) (0.097) (0.082) (0.107)
Time Trend 0.194??? 0.212???
(0.014) (0.016)
Region Fixed Eects No Yes No Yes
Year Fixed Eects No No Yes Yes
N 5928 5928 5928 5928
Table 1.5: Reduced-form estimates of radio stations’ entry decisions. Ro-
bust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the district level (137 clus-
ters). Specication (2) is used to predict radio stations’ reactions in the
forward simulation.
the time trend instead of the year xed eects. This is because using year xed eects
would involve simulating the year coecients forward. Since I only use 21 years of data,
such a function would be estimated imprecisely.
After a station becomes authorized, it must wait some time before it can begin actively
broadcasting. The amount of time this takes for each rm is not correlated with observ-
able variables so I assume it to be random. Therefore I model the transition from being
authorized to actively broadcasting as a Poisson process with arrival rate λ. To estimate
λ, I nd the number of quarters between the date the station rst became authorized and
when it started actively broadcasting and t a Poisson distribution to it. The resulting
estimate is 5.16 quarters which results in a probability of 0.194 of becoming active each
quarter after authorization. This corresponds to an annualized rate of 0.578. The t is
illustrated in Figure A·8 which captures the transitions well.
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Estimate Standard Error
Entry Cost 83.919 (5.083)
Log population 0.742 (0.051)
Commercial Competition −0.057 (0.006)
Public Competition −0.079 (0.025)
Time Trend 0.030 (0.003)
Standard errors were obtained by drawing 200 subsamples of
clusters of station locations and re-estimating the model.
Table 1.6: Entry cost and prot function parameter estimates.
Once a station is actively broadcasting, there is an exogenous probability that it exits.
I take the average exit rate in the data which is 0.0055 per year. There are too few exits to
obtain a precise function predicting exit.
1.7.2 Structural Parameters
Table 1.6 shows the prot function parameter estimates. The entry cost is positive and is
a large multiple of variable prots for all stations (between 7 and 14 times annual prots).
More populated areas have higher prots and higher competition erodes prots. The
positive time trend indicates that prots are increasing over time, explaining the larger
observed entry in the later time periods. The subsampled standard errors are slightly
larger than what would have been obtained using the Hessian of the likelihood, although
each parameter is statistically dierent from zero in either case.
The model was estimated under the assumption that if a station deviates from equilib-
rium play, only immediately-connected rivals were allowed to deviate. This assumption
was made to ease the computational burden in estimation. Figure A·9 shows the param-
eter estimates from the model when we increase the threshold number of nodes where
stations are allowed to deviate. From the gure we can see that allowing a higher number
of nodes does not change the parameter estimates in a substantial way, indicating that the
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assumption that deviations do not spill through is reasonable.
Without detailed data on prots or costs on the stations, interpreting these coecients
in dollar terms is dicult, as they are scaled relative to the variance of the error terms.
However, Yordy (2008) collected data on the startup costs and annual costs of many radio
stations in Africa, including a commercial station in Ghana. Classic FM in Techiman which
entered in 1999 had a startup cost of 52,041.60 USD and had annual costs of 122,235.36 USD.
If we take Classic FM to be representative, then one unit in the estimates can be interpreted
as 2,240.79 USD. The model then implies that the prot per person in Classic FM’s coverage
area is about 19 cents. While this number may seem small, Pandora earns only $12.44 in
advertising revenue annually per active monthly user. Given the 13-fold dierence in per
capita GDP PPP between Ghana and USA, and that not everyone in Classic FM’s coverage
area will actively listen to the station, these numbers are comparable.
1.8 Counterfactual Simulations
There is a large literature documenting various eects of radio and other media through
the information transmission channel, as discussed in the literature review. For the most
part, these eects for radio are positive. These positive eects continue in the current
setting, as radio coverage is found to decrease malaria incidence among children and in-
crease night lights growth. However, regulations facing the radio stations may lead radio
coverage to be underprovided in certain rural areas. Alternative regulation schemes could
expand coverage to rural areas, allowing more communities to experience the benets of
radio. In this section, I use the estimated structural model to simulate the eects of coun-
terfactual regulation schemes that aim to increase radio coverage.
For the counterfactual simulations, it is necessary to discretize the state space. I divide
each of the continuous state variables (population, commercial station competition and
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public station competition) into ve bins and leave time as a discrete variable. I use the
Pakes and McGuire (1994) algorithm to solve for the new equilibrium value functions and
strategies.
1.8.1 Larger Broadcasting Radius
Commercial radio stations in Ghana are restricted to a 45km broadcasting radius. In rural
areas, a small broadcasting radius may not make it worthwhile to enter. The coverage
from stations operating in larger towns will also not spill further into rural areas. An
alternative policy would have been to allow stations to have a larger broadcasting radius.
The outcome of such a policy is not obvious ex-ante. On the one hand, a larger radius in-
creases the potential listenership of a station which increases prots. However, this could
also increase the amount of competition a station faces, which would decrease prots.
Figure 1·11 shows an example of a station’s coverage area if the transmitter power dou-
bled. Doubling the transmitter power does not double the broadcasting radius, but rather
depends on the surrounding terrain. There is some concern that allowing stronger trans-
mitters will cause interference among stations’ frequencies. However, the radio market
in Ghana is young and the frequency spectrum is not constrained outside of the capital
city.
For each location in the model, I recalculate what the coverage would have been if sta-
tions were allowed to double their signal strength. This results in a new overlap matrix of
how much the coverage from each station in the model overlaps with every other station.
I use this new overlap matrix to solve for the new equilibrium strategies for the rms.
The results from this counterfactual are shown in Figure 1·12. For each of the statistics
shown, I draw actions for each player from the new policy functions and take the average
of many draws. In the rst gure we see that relative to the baseline, more stations enter
under this policy overall. However, when analyzing the eects of radio coverage, it is the
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Double transmier strength Normal transmier strength
Figure 1·11: Example change in coverage area by doubling transmitter
strength.
extensive margin which matters for the positive outcomes of radio coverage. In the second
gure, I calculate the proportion of the country which has access to radio coverage. Over
time, coverage is spreading throughout the country. With stronger transmitter strengths,
between 8.6% and 13.9% more of the country has radio coverage. While a lot more of the
country is receiving coverage, it may be in areas with very low population. In the third
gure, I use the population maps shown in Figure A·4 to calculate the population receiving
coverage. Using this, between 1.2 and 1.8 million additional individuals are covered over
time.
According to the 2010 census in Ghana (Ghana Statistical Service, 2012), approxi-
mately 20% of the population are in the 2-10 age range. This is the age range at which the
malaria incidence estimates are based on. Using the estimated 1.4% reduction in malaria
incidence rate from radio coverage, there are a predicted 3,360-5,040 fewer incidences over
a ve-year period for children aged 2-10 under this policy. While this number is small for
a country with over 5 million children, this policy does not involve the policymaker using
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Figure 1·12: Results from counterfactual simulations where stations in the
model have stronger transmitter strengths.
funds to subsidize the stations. The stations provide the additional coverage voluntarily.
While the mortality rate from malaria is less than 1%, the economic costs of contracting
malaria are high. For example, Bleakley (2010) nds that persistent childhood malaria in-
fection reduces adult income by as much as 50%. Furthermore, radio coverage will bring
other benets to these communities, such as increased night lights growth.
1.8.2 Entry Subsidy
An alternative way to increase entry in rural areas would be to provide a subsidy to the
stations. In this counterfactual, I alter the entry cost parameter faced by the stations.
Recall that since there is very little exit in the data, the entry cost and xed cost are not
separately identied and as such the entry cost can be interpreted as the entry cost plus
an annuity of the xed costs. Therefore a small change in this parameter results in a large
change in the sum of discounted prots for the stations. I present the change in entry
patterns for a 5% and a 10% reduction in the entry cost. Figure 1·13 presents the results.
A change in the entry cost results in a large increase in the overall number of station.
However, while the change in the total number of stations is much larger than under the
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Figure 1·13: Results from counterfactual simulations where all stations in
the model are subsidized.
policy with stronger transmitter strengths, it does not have as profound an impact on the
percentage of the country receiving coverage or the population receiving coverage. Even
with the 10% reduction in the entry cost parameter, more individuals are reached under
the counterfactual scenario with stronger transmitter strengths. Therefore the preferred
policy would be to allow stronger transmitter strength, as this does not result in lost
revenue to the regulator.
1.9 Conclusion
Radio has been found to have eects in many facets of life, including political participa-
tion, education and health. This is especially important in developing economies where
radio is more common than other forms of mass media. Complementing the previous re-
search on the eects of media, I nd that radio coverage reduces malaria incidence and
increases night lights growth using a novel identication strategy. This identication
strategy exploits streaks of coverage spilling through gaps in mountainous areas. The
result concerning malaria incidence is also supported using Demographic Health Survey
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data, where individuals with coverage are found to be more likely to have their children
sleep under mosquito bed nets. These positive eects of radio make it important for broad-
casting regulators to understand commercial radio stations’ entry and exit motives. Regu-
lations on transmitter strengths and entry costs could deter entry in rural areas, resulting
in less information provision. A structural model is necessary to study the eects of such
policy changes as the decision to enter is inherently dynamic and the reactions of rival
stations need to be considered. I develop a dynamic structural model of entry which takes
into account the overlap of stations’ coverage areas and uses those to measure market
size and competition. Using this model, I simulate counterfactual policies with dierent
regulation schemes. In one such policy, the stations are allowed to have stronger trans-
mitter strengths which would expand each station’s coverage area. More stations enter
under this policy, and their radio coverage expands to more rural areas. More individu-
als receive radio coverage and receive the benets that come with radio coverage, such as
lower malaria incidence and increased growth. In an alternative counterfactual, I simulate
entry where stations receive an entry subsidy. This policy increases the overall number
of stations, but mostly in urban areas which already have radio coverage. A more eec-
tive policy to expand coverage to rural areas is therefore to allow stronger transmitter
strengths.
48
Chapter 2
Radio Regulation and Voter Turnout in Benin
Coauthored with Calixte Ahokpossi (International Monetary Fund)
2.1 Introduction
Radio is an important part of society in Benin and other developing economies. For many
individuals, radio may be the only source of news. Only 28.2% of Benin’s population
have access to electricity and 4.9% have access to the internet1. The literacy rate is 42.4%,
making Benin one of the eleven countries in the world with a literacy rate below 50%2.
Therefore a large portion of Benin’s population is unable to obtain news from either news-
papers, television or the internet. Radios can be purchased at low cost and can be run on
batteries, enabling many individuals in developing countries to own one. In Benin’s small
population of approximately 10 million people, 54 dierent languages are spoken3. This
gives greater importance to local radio stations which can broadcast in the vernacular of
the region. Radio is not only important as a source of news but can inform listeners in
other areas such as health and education. For example, Keefer and Khemani (2014) nd
that education programs broadcast by local radio in northern Benin encourage greater
parental investment.
Given the importance of radio as a source of news, it is interesting to study the role
1Source: The World Bank, http://data.worldbank.org
2Source: UNESCO Institute for Statistics, http://data.uis.unesco.org/
3Source: http://www.ethnologue.com
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of radio in how it aects the level of political participation among individuals. Being in-
formed of public aairs can instill interest in politics and encourage discussion of various
policies. For this reason, radio can play a very important role in any well-functioning
democracy. Benin’s transition to democracy since the fall of the Marxist-Leninist regime
of Mathieu Kérékou in 1989 has been regarded as one of the most successful transitions
in Africa (Seely, 2005, 2009). Freedom House considers Benin among the best-performing
African countries for press freedom4 and voter turnout in the 2011 Presidential Election
was 84.8%5. It is interesting therefore to understand the role of media consumption and
the presence of local radio stations in the country’s success as a peaceful democracy and
its high level of political participation.
The eect of the media on voter turnout has been widely studied. Gentzkow (2006)
used plausibly exogenous spatial variation in the introduction of television across the US
to nd its eect on voter turnout. He nds that television accounted for between 25-50%
of the total decline in voter turnout since the 1950s. He attributes this to substitution
away from newspapers and radio which have greater political coverage. Gerber et al.
(2009) performed an experiment in Virginia where the treatment groups received a free
subscription to either the Washington Post or the Washington Times. They nd that the
newspapers increased support for the Democratic candidate and increased voter turnout
in the following election. Oberholzer-Gee and Waldfogel (2009) nd that Hispanic voter
turnout is higher in US metro areas that broadcast Spanish-language local television news.
Cagé (2017) studied the eect of the number of local newspapers on voter turnout in
France between 1945-2012. In particular, she examined the eect of moving from n > 0
newspapers to n+1 newspapers. She nds that monopolist newspapers are more likely to
provide hard news which benets voter turnout. Further entry of newspapers is associated
4Source: Freedom House,
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2012/benin#.U_USsBopDH4
5Source: African Elections Database, http://africanelections.tripod.com/bj.html
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with soft news and fewer articles. This “dumbing down” of news following entry decreases
voter turnout.
In this paper, we use radio entry data from Benin’s broadcasting regulator (rst col-
lected by Ahokpossi (2009)) combined with several rounds of Afrobarometer survey data
to estimate the relationship between local radio station availability and voter turnout. We
nd a non-monotonic eect of the number of local radio stations on voter turnout: on
average, a small number of local stations increases turnout while beyond three stations,
additional stations decrease voter turnout. This non-monotonic result is similar to Cagé’s
(2017) nding. Increased competition between stations can lead them to provide less in-
formative content and this can reduce voter turnout.
Following our ndings of radio station access on voter turnout, we then estimate a
dynamic radio station entry model to simulate counterfactual policies that focus on in-
creasing access. In one counterfactual, we simulate the eect of targeted entry subsidies
in areas without any local radio stations. We nd that even a small subsidy of 5% of the
entry cost can incentivize entry in areas without stations. Using the estimated eect of
radio station competition on voter turnout, we nd that the policy would increase voter
turnout by 2.1%.
In another counterfactual, we consider the eect of removing regulatory ineciency
on entry. A feature of the broadcasting industry in Benin is that entry is not allowed
every year, rather only when the regulator makes a call for applications. In the decade
since commercial entry was allowed there were four calls for applications: in 1997, 1998,
2002 and 2007. Given the large delays between calls and their erratic timing, this may
aect entry decisions. In this counterfactual, we simulate what would happen if entry
was allowed every year, rather than only when there is a call for applications. We nd
that approximately twice as many radio stations enter under this scenario, with every
municipality in the country served by a radio station as early as 2003. Using the estimated
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eect of radio station competition on voter turnout, this policy would increase turnout by
2.6%.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Benin’s Transition to Democracy
Benin is a small country of 10 million inhabitants in West Africa, bordering Togo, Burk-
ina Faso, Niger and Nigeria. It was a French colony since the nineteenth century until
it received its independence in 1960. The rst few years of its independence was a pe-
riod of peaceful multiparty rule. However, between 1963 and 1972 there were a series
of successful military coups. These coups were so frequent that Benin held the record
for the most coups since independence in Africa until 1985 (Gisselquist, 2008). The nal
coup in October 1972 saw Maj. Mathieu Kérékou installed as president with a military
administration. In 1974, Kérékou renamed the country the People’s Republic of Benin
and adopted Marxist-Leninist policies. This involved nationalizing many sectors of the
economy, including the radio broadcasting sector.
By 1989, the state was in considerable debt and civil servants’ salaries were not paid
for eight months. Public sector employees protested over unpaid wages and France sus-
pended its nancial support. Following these and other pressures, Kérérkou abandoned
the Marxist-Leninist ideology and a national conference was held to discuss the transition
to multiparty rule. Benin then became the rst African country to make the post-Cold-
War transition from Marxism-Leninism to democracy. Benin’s transition to democracy
has been described as one of the most successful in African history. This success was
even more remarkable considering the country’s GDP per capita was only $273 (in 2000
US$) at the time of the transition. The country now holds presidential elections every ve
years and legislative assembly elections every four years. Since the transition, alterna-
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tions of power have been peaceful and stable and a majority of the population support
democracy as the best form of rule. For more information about Benin’s transition to
democracy see Gisselquist (2008) and Seely (2005, 2009). Given this successful transition
to democracy, we are interested in the role of radio station entry in contributing to voter
turnout.
2.2.2 The Radio Broadcasting Market in Benin
Until 1997, the radio broadcasting market was a government monopoly. Since then, entry
of private radio stations is allowed but regulated by LaHaute Autorité de la Communication
Audiovisuelle (the High Authority for Broadcasting and Communication, or the HAAC).
For radio station entry to take place, the HAAC must rst make a call for applications.
The serious and qualied applicants are then allowed to formally apply to operate. Finally,
selected stations are authorized to build and operate their station. Radio stations in Benin
are classied into one of ve categories: private commercial, private non-commercial,
religious, government-owned and international. Only the rst three of these are subject
to the HAAC’s entry regulations. In addition, private commercial stations must derive at
least 60% of their revenue from advertising as opposed to other sources, such as private
donations. In contrast, private non-commercial stations are permitted to have a maximum
of 30% of their revenues come from advertising.
Four calls for applications were made in the rst decade following liberalization. These
occurred in 1997, 1998, 2002 and 2007. The erratic timing of these calls for applications is
due to regulatory ineciency. One of the main reasons for this ineciency is as follows.
The entire regulatory board is renewed every ve years. By the time the new board has
become familiar with the process and is ready to have a call for applications, their term is
almost over, managing to make only one or two calls for applications. This erratic timing
is a major barrier to entry: potential entrants are unable to predict when the next call
53
for applications will be and therefore qualied entrants may choose alternative ventures
instead. For a case study about the process of setting up a particular radio station in
Northern Benin, see Grätz (1999).
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Radio Station Data
We use radio entry data from the HAAC collected by Ahokpossi (2009). The data show
the number of radio stations that entered each of Benin’s 77 communes (municipalities)
over the four years where there were calls for applications: 1997, 1998, 2002 and 2007. The
data focuses solely on private commercial and private non-commercial stations. This is
because religious stations target a dierent audience and state-owned and international
stations are subject to dierent regulations.
Figure 2·1 visualizes the radio station entry. It shows the cumulative entry of radio
stations in each commune at each year in which applications were called. In the rst year,
there was little entry, with the only entrants appearing in the wealthier southern part of
the country. Over time, radio stations entered throughout the rest of the country with a
higher concentration of radios in the south.
We use the commune to dene market borders for our analysis. This is justied on
several grounds. Over fty languages are spoken in Benin and each commune has a dom-
inant language that is often dierent from neighboring communes. Inhabitants of the
communes also identify themselves strongly with their commune and would be proud to
have a radio station if they could have one. Furthermore, transport costs are high in Benin
and therefore advertisers try to target local customers. For these reasons, broadcasting is
mainly directed at the inhabitants of the commune.
We drop Cotonou in the analysis because it is an outlier, as it has twice the number of
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Figure 2·1: Cumulative entry of radio stations in each of Benin’s com-
munes (municipalities). The years shown are each year the regulator made
a call for applications.
radio stations and twice the population of any other commune. We also merge the com-
mune Lokossa with its surrounding commune Athiémè to be consistent with the shapele
of commune borders6. Athiémè had no radio stations in the data while Lokossa had three
stations by 2007. This leaves a balanced panel of 75 markets with four years of where calls
for applications have been made.
For the radio station entry model, variables are needed that describe the current state
of the world facing potential radio stations. The presence of competition is given by the
6Shapeles of administrative boundaries were obtained from Global Administrative Areas (GADM).
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number of rival radio stations already active in the market. Competing newspapers and
television are not used as state variables because of a lack of data. However, penetration
of other types of media is very low, as will be seen in the survey data. Therefore it is
likely that they do not pose a large threat to radio station prots. For a measure of market
attractiveness, we use the log population of the commune. We obtained commune-level
population data from Benin’s National Institute of Statistics and Economic Analysis, IN-
SAE7. We use the three most recent censuses (1992, 2002 and 2013) and linearly interpolate
to obtain each commune’s population for each year. Maps of log commune population
during these census years are shown in Figure B·1. From these maps, we can see that the
locations with many radio stations tend to be the locations with more inhabitants.
2.3.2 Survey Data
We use survey data from The Afrobarometer to study the eect of radio station com-
petition on voter turnout. The Afrobarometer is an independent, nonpartisan research
project that measures the social, political, and economic atmosphere in Africa. They con-
ducted three rounds of the survey in 2005, 2008 and 2011 throughout Benin8. In each
round, between 1,000-1,200 randomly-chosen individuals were surveyed at their home
and were asked over 100 questions, including questions about their political views and
media consumption. These surveys also include what commune the respondents live in,
which allows us to merge the data with the radio station entry data.
Summary statistics from the data are shown in Table 2.1. We can see that voter turnout
is very high, averaging at 91% among survey respondents. While it is possible that certain
survey respondents lied about having voted, this gure is roughly in line with aggregated
voter turnout for Benin: the 2011 Presidential Election had a turnout of 84.8%9. Radio own-
7Available to download at: http://www.insae-bj.org/
8Available to download at http://www.afrobarometer.org/data/data-by-country/benin
9Source: African Elections Database
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Mean SD Min Median Max N
Voted in previous election 0.91 0.29 0.00 1.00 1.00 3205
Number of radio stations 1.37 1.51 0.00 1.00 6.00 3208
Owns a radio 0.71 0.45 0.00 1.00 1.00 3204
Owns a television 0.24 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00 3201
Reads the newspaper regularly 0.08 0.26 0.00 0.00 1.00 3183
Female 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 3208
Age 37.18 13.85 18.00 35.00 92.00 3183
Employed full time 0.25 0.43 0.00 0.00 1.00 3191
Employed part time 0.12 0.33 0.00 0.00 1.00 3191
Informal schooling only 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.00 1.00 3194
No formal schooling 0.48 0.50 0.00 0.00 1.00 3194
Post-graduate 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 1.00 3194
Post-secondary qualications, not university 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 1.00 3194
Primary school completed 0.05 0.21 0.00 0.00 1.00 3194
Secondary school completed/high school 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00 1.00 3194
Some primary schooling 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 1.00 3194
Some secondary school/high school 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.00 1.00 3194
Some university 0.01 0.12 0.00 0.00 1.00 3194
University completed 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 1.00 3194
Table 2.1: Summary Statistics from the combined Afrobarometer survey
data from 2005, 2008 and 2011. Observations from Cotonou are omitted.
ership among survey respondents is high at 71% while only 24% own a television (recall
only 28.2% of Benin’s population have access to electricity). Only 37% are formally em-
ployed and most have very little education. Approximately 5% have completed secondary
education with most respondents having only primary and some secondary education.
2.4 Radio Station Competition and Voter Turnout
To motivate the radio station entry model and the counterfactual analyses, we are inter-
ested in the relationship between the number of local radio stations and voter turnout.
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Dependent variable:
Voted in previous election (1) (2) (3)
Number of stations 0.038?? 0.033?? 0.032?
(0.019) (0.017) (0.017)
Number of stations squared −0.006??? −0.005??? −0.005???
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age 0.017??? 0.017???
(0.002) (0.002)
Age squared 0.000??? 0.000???
(0.000) (0.000)
Female −0.043??? −0.046???
(0.010) (0.010)
Employed full time 0.035?? 0.037??
(0.016) (0.016)
Educational attainment dummies No No Yes
Year xed eects No Yes Yes
Commune xed eects Yes Yes Yes
N 3205 3163 3150
?: p < 0.1 ??: p < 0.05 ???: p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the commune level
in parentheses.
Table 2.2: Voter turnout and radio station competition.
We run the following regression:
votedicy = β1 (#stations)cy + β2 (#stations)2cy + x′icyγ + αc + δy + εicy
votedicy is whether the survey respondent voted i in commune c in year y voted in the
previous election. (#stations)cy is the number of local radio stations in the commune in
that year. xicy includes relevant control variables, such as age, gender, employment status
and a host of educational attainment dummies. We also include commune xed eects
and year xed eects.
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Dependent variable:
Voted in previous election (1) (2) (3)
Owns a radio 0.046??? 0.020 0.021?
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Owns a television 0.007 −0.004 −0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Reads the newspaper −0.019 −0.020 −0.017
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Age 0.017??? 0.016???
(0.002) (0.002)
Age squared 0.000??? 0.000???
(0.000) (0.000)
Female −0.041??? −0.043???
(0.010) (0.011)
Employed full time 0.035?? 0.036??
(0.016) (0.016)
Educational attainment dummies No No Yes
Year xed eects No Yes Yes
Commune xed eects Yes Yes Yes
N 3171 3134 3122
?: p < 0.1 ??: p < 0.05 ???: p < 0.01. Standard errors clustered at the commune level
in parentheses.
Table 2.3: Voter turnout and media consumption.
Table 2.2 shows the regression results. In each specication, we see that there is a non-
monotonic relationship between the number of local radio stations on voter turnout. Voter
turnout is on average increasing in the rst three local radio stations but each additional
radio station beyond that reduces turnout. Given the estimates, a commune with six radio
stations has on average a lower voter turnout than one with no stations. The estimates
are robust to adding or removing dierent controls variables, such as demographics or
educational attainment dummies.
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This negative eect of excess radio station entry is similar to the result in Cagé (2017)
who found the same eect for newspapers in France over 1945-2012. She nds that with-
out competition, newspapers provide hard news which informs the public of current af-
fairs. However, as competition increases, she nds that the proportion of articles with soft
news also increases, which are less informative. While we have no data on the content
of the radio stations’ broadcasts, the results here could have the same mechanism as in
Cagé (2017): with high competition, radio stations may compete for listeners by dieren-
tiating their broadcasts with less informative content. For example, a monopolist station
may have a range of dierent programs throughout the day, while in markets with many
competing stations there could be stations which play only music.
We can also examine how dierent forms of mass media are related to voter turnout.
In Table 2.3, we regress turnout on radio ownership, television ownership and newspaper
readership. Only radio ownership has a signicant eect on voter turnout, while televi-
sion and newspapers are not signicantly dierent from zero. This further highlights the
potential importance of radio for political participation.
2.5 Radio Station Entry Model
Now that we have estimates of the relationship between radio penetration and voter
turnout, we are interested in why radio stations choose to locate where they do, and
how the regulatory environment aects this choice. With a structural model of the radio
stations’ entry decisions, we can simulate the eects of counterfactual policies on entry.
Using our estimates of the eect of radio station competition on voter turnout, we can
then evaluate the eectiveness of alternative policies.
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2.5.1 Model Setup
The country is divided into M independent markets and each market has F potential en-
trants. Each potential entrant f = 1, . . . , F makes decisions at times t = 1, 2, . . . ,∞
whether or not to enter into the market. Call the action of an entrant a f t ∈ A = {0, 1},
where 0 denotes staying out of the market and 1 denotes entering. Potential entrants’
actions will depend on a publicly-observable market state and private information. The
market state is given by the number of incumbents nmt ∈ {0, · · · , F } = F and exoge-
nous prot shifters zmt ∈ Z which includes a measure of market protability and a time
trend. Potential entrants receive private information about each of their actions, ν0
f mt
and
ν1
f mt
, where
(
ν0
f mt
,ν1
f mt
)
= ν f mt ∈ V ⊆ R2. Entering entails paying a sunk cost θEC and
incumbent rms earn prots pi f (nmt ,zt ,θ ). These prots are parameterized as
pi f (nmt ,zmt ,θ ) = θMmmt + θC (nmt − 1) + θT t
where mmt is the market size measured by log population and nmt is the number of in-
cumbent rms.
Entry is not possible every year; rather it is only possible if the regulator makes a
call for applications. Let k be the number of periods since the last call for applications.
The probability the regulator will make a call for applications each year is modeled as
λ5−k , where λ ∈ [0, 1]. This assumes that the regulatory board will make at least one call
for applications during their ve-year tenure. The probabilities for application calls for
λ = 0.5 given by this method are shown in Figure 2·2. This method makes it more likely
for a call to occur, the longer it has been since a call. Using this produces delays similar
to what is seen in the data (recall that the call years were 1997, 1998, 2002 and 2007).
In the data, no stations ever exit. Therefore we do not model exit as a choice for a
station. Once a station enters, it no longer plays the game. With this, the ex-ante expected
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Figure 2·2: Probability of a call for applications as a function of years since
last call for applications for λ = 0.5.
value from entering is given by:
V 1f (nmt ,zmt ,θ ) = −θEC + E
[ ∞∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tpi f (nmτ ,zmτ ,θ )
nmt ,zmt
]
where β ∈ [0, 1) is the common discount factor across rms. The expected value from
staying out is dened as:
V 0f (nmt ,zmt ,θ ) =λ4βE
[
max
{
E
[
V 0f (nmt+1,zmt+1,θ )
nmt , zmt ] + ν0f mt+1,
E
[
V 1f (nmt+1,zmt+1,θ )
nmt , zmt ] + ν1f mt+1, }] +(
1 − λ4) βE [V 0f (nmt ,zmt ,θ )nmt ,zmt ]
It is optimal for a station to enter if the expected present discounted value of entering
exceeds the outside option of staying out of the market:
V 1f (nmt ,zmt ,θ ) + ν1f mt ≥ V 0f (nmt ,zmt ,θ ) + ν0f mt
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2.5.2 Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept we will use is Markov Perfection. Call σ f : F × Z ×V → A a
Markov strategy, which maps the current state and private information shock for a rm
into an action. σ =
{
σ f
}F
f =1 is a Markov strategy prole for all rms in the market. σ is
a Markov perfect equilibrium strategy prole if ∀f , ∀m, ∀t we have that:
V af (σ ,nmt ,zmt ,θ ) + νafmt ≥ V 1−af
(
σ−f ,nmt ,zmt ,θ
)
+ ν1−afmt
when σ f
(
nmt ,zmt ,ν f t
)
= a. That is, no rm has an incentive to deviate from σ provided
every other rm plays according to σ . Following the standard in the literature of dynamic
games estimation, we assume that the same Markov perfect equilibrium is being played
in all markets.
2.6 Estimation
2.6.1 Discretizing the State Space
We rst discretize log population into ve bins, with an equal number of observations
in each bin. The other state variables, namely the number of incumbents and the time
period, are already discrete. Each state s = 1, . . . , S is then the combination of every
possible number of incumbents and each value of the exogenous prot shifters, zmt . We
set the maximum number of incumbents to be 6, the maximum observed in the data. The
value of entering in each state can then be written in vector form:
V 1 (θ ) = −θEC + βPe
∞∑
τ=0
βτ (Pc)τ pi (θ )
= −θEC + βPe [I − βPc]−1 pi (θ )
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Pe and Pc are the S × S state transition probabilities when the rm decides to enter and
remain an incumbent, respectively. pi (θ ) are the ow prots in each of the S states. As-
suming the ν0
f mt
and ν1
f mt
each follow a Type I extreme value distribution, the value of
staying out in each state is:
V 0 (θ ) = λ4β log
(
ePsV
0(θ ) + ePsV
1(θ )
)
+
(
1 − λ4) βPsV 0 (θ )
Here, Ps is the S × S state transition probability matrix when the rm decides to stay out
of the market.
Given a parameter vector, θ , and transition probability matrices, Pe and Pc , we can
compute V 1 (θ ) directly. V 0 (θ ) cannot be solved directly, but can be found using a xed
point algorithm, given values of θ , Ps and V 1 (θ ). The probability of a station entering in
each state is then given by:
p (θ ) = exp (V 1 (θ )) /(exp (V 0 (θ )) + exp (V 1 (θ )) )
2.6.2 Transition Probability Matrices
We estimate the transition probabilities for log population using the observed frequencies
of transitions from the data. This assumes that the equilibrium play of radio station entry
does not aect population directly. The time trend mechanically increases by one each
period, except in the nal period where we assume it remains the same forever. The
transition probabilities for the exogenous prot shifters are then given by Pr (zt+1 |zt ).
The transition probabilities for the number of incumbents, however, depends on the
value functions. Given rm entry probabilities in each state, we can use the binomial
formula to calculate the probability of each possible number of new incumbents for each
dierent transition matrix. Under Pe , the rm chooses to enter, which has a mechanical
eect on the number of incumbents and the number of remaining entrants. Under Ps ,
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the maximum number of possible entrants is reduced since the rm decided to stay out.
Under Pc , the rm is already an incumbent, so there is one fewer potential entrant.
Suppose in state s , nt = i and zt = k and in state s′, nt+1 = j and zt+1 = `. Then each
element of each transition matrix is given by:
Pc (s′|s) =
(
F − i
j − i
)
[p (s,θ )]j−i [1 − p (s,θ )]F−j Pr (zt+1 = ` |zt = k)
Pe (s′|s) =
(
F − i − 1
j − i − 1
)
[p (s,θ )]j−i−1 [1 − p (s,θ )]F−j Pr (zt+1 = ` |zt = k)
Ps (s′|s) =
(
F − i − 1
j − i
)
[p (s,θ )]j−i [1 − p (s,θ )]F−j−1 Pr (zt+1 = ` |zt = k)
2.6.3 Objective Function
Given a particular guess of the parameter vector θ , we start with an initial guess of the
transition probability matrices to compute both V 0 (θ ) and V 1 (θ ). From there we iter-
ate similar to Pakes and McGuire (1994) by using the new value functions to compute
new transition matrices, and using the new transition matrices to compute new value
functions, until the distance between the new and old value functions are below some tol-
erance level. Given these resulting value functions, we simulate entry 100,000 times and
nd the modal entry decision for each potential entrant from the simulations. We then
use the following objective function to estimate the model’s parameters, which minimizes
the model’s prediction error of the number of rms in each market-year:
θˆ = argmin
θ
M∑
m=1
T∑
t=1
(
ndatamt − nmodelmt (θ )
)2
2.7 Structural Model Parameter Estimates
Table 2.4 shows the parameter estimates from the entry model. Prots are increasing
in population and decreasing in competition. The estimated time trend term is small,
65
as increases in log population capture the increasing market attractiveness over time.
Estimating parameters is highly computationally costly because, for each trial value of
the parameters, we need to solve for the value functions and simulate thousands of entry
decisions. Therefore bootstrapping standard errors by drawing many samples of market
histories would take a considerable amount of time, and are currently not reported.
Parameter
Estimate
Entry cost 32.518
Log population 0.299
Competition −0.093
Trend 0.002
Table 2.4: Prot function parameter estimates.
1997 1998 2002 2007
Number of stations 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Figure 2·3: Modal prediction from 100,000 simulations of the model.
Figure 2·3 shows the modal prediction of 100,000 simulations of the model. For the few
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communes with a large amount of entry, the model somewhat underpredicts entry. The
model predicts no entrants in the rst period of data, while in the data there were seven
entrants. Otherwise, however, the parsimonious model of only four parameters captures
the overall entry patterns quite well.
2.8 Counterfactual Simulations
2.8.1 Targeted Entry Subsidy
In Table 2.2 we saw that the number of local radio stations has a non-monotonic relation-
ship with voter turnout. Therefore a policy aimed at increasing the presence rather than
the total quantity of local radio stations could increase voter turnout in certain areas. One
counterfactual policy we estimate is where entry subsidies are given to new entrants only
if the market does not already have an active radio station. We model this subsidy as a
reduction in the entry cost when the market has no incumbents.
Figure 2·4 shows the modal result from 100,000 simulations of entry decisions after
solving the model with the new parameters. A small subsidy of 5% is enough to incentivize
entry in most communes within the rst year and eventually reach all communes by the
end of the data. A 10% subsidy is enough to incentivize stations in all communes to enter
in the rst year.
If we use the predicted number of radio stations in these counterfactual simulations,
together with the estimated coecients in the fourth column of Table 2.1, a 5% and 10%
entry subsidy would increase voter turnout in the country by 2.1% and 3.2%, respectively
in 2005.
2.8.2 Removing Regulatory Ineciency
Only holding calls for applications at erratic times can slow the growth of the industry.
Potential entrants who would have opened a radio station may have chosen an outside
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1997 1998 2002 2007
Number of stations 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
(a) Simulation of radio station entry where new entrants in unserved communes receive a 5% entry
subsidy
1997 1998 2002 2007
Number of stations 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
(b) Simulation of radio station entry where new entrants in unserved communes receive a 10%
entry subsidy
Figure 2·4: Targeted subsidy counterfactual simulations.
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Figure 2·5: Radio entry without regulatory ineciency. In the counterfac-
tual, we set λ = 1 and allow entry every year, rather than only 1997, 1998,
2002 and 2007, as in the data.
alternative when entry was not possible. We also run a counterfactual where entry is
allowed every year starting in 1997, rather than only during years where there was a
call for applications. We incorporate this into the model by setting λ = 1, so that the
probability of a call for applications in the following year is always one. The results are
shown in Figure 2·5. The red and green lines show the total number of stations which
entered in the data and predicted by the model (when λ = 0.5), respectively. The blue line
shows the total number of stations which enter when we solve the model for λ = 1. We
can see that over time there is approximately twice as much entry compared to the data.
However, given the result on voter turnout, we are interested in the spread of radio
across the country rather than the total number of radio stations. Figure B·2 shows the
proportion of communes which are served by a radio station in the data and in the coun-
terfactual. We can see that in that data, only 60% of communes are served by the end of
the sample in 2007. In the counterfactual simulation with entry allowed every year, all
communes are served by 2003. If we take the estimated coecients from Table 2.2 with
these predictions, 2005 voter turnout would increase by 2.6%. Thus, removing the reg-
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ulatory ineciency is another means through which radio coverage could be expanded
throughout the country, which may be a lower-cost alternative to providing subsidies to
entering radio stations.
2.9 Conclusion
Radio is the most accessible broadcasting medium in the developing world and ensuring
that areas can receive radio broadcasts is very important for public policy. Local stations
inform the community of politics, health, education and local aairs in the local language
of the community. Policymakers, therefore, need to understand the benets of local radio
on the surrounding community and the barriers faced by potential entrants in the broad-
casting market. In this paper, we nd a non-monotonic relationship between the number
of local radio stations and voter turnout: the presence of a small number of local stations
on average raises turnout, while too many stations reduce turnout. Given this result for
voter turnout, as well as the other estimated positive benets of radio from the literature,
radio may be underprovided in certain areas. Indeed, even after the fourth call for applica-
tions, many municipalities were without stations in Benin. Policies aimed at fostering the
growth of the radio industry should, therefore, focus on the geographic spread of radio
stations rather than their overall quantity. Targeted entry subsidies or holding calls for
applications each year instead of erratically could increase entry in such areas, bringing
the benets of radio to these locations.
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Chapter 3
Branch Location Strategies and Financial
Service Access in Thai Banking
Coauthored with Marc Rysman (Boston University) and Robert M. Townsend (Massachusetts
Institute of Technology)
3.1 Introduction
Countries that suer a nancial crisis often see the real economy seriously impacted.
Naturally, a major concern during a nancial crisis is whether households and rms have
access to credit. A standard way to evaluate when access to credit normalizes is to look
at when aggregate measures of economic activity, such as GDP growth and interest rates,
return to pre-crisis levels. However, in this paper, we identify a new channel by which
nancial crises impact access to credit that can be much longer-lived than would be sug-
gested by aggregate measures, which is particularly important for developing countries.
Households often obtain their banking services from banks that are geographically
close. This is particularly true in developing countries, where households rely heavily on
the presence of local bank branches for credit and banking services. Moreover, developing
countries typically have incomplete branching networks with signicant gaps in coverage,
especially in rural areas. Because nancial crises particularly aect the functioning of
banks, a nancial crisis can cause banks to restrict the expansion of their branch networks,
or even reduce the size of their networks. To the extent that banks fail to replace these
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branches, even after the economy recovers, the eects of the crises can be long-lived, and
can negatively impact local communities long after aggregate measures of growth suggest
the eects of the crisis is over.
We explore this issue in Thailand, which suered a major nancial crisis in 1997. Ag-
gregate measures of economic activity recovered relatively quickly. For instance, GDP
growth and unemployment recovered within two to three years, interest rates declined
shortly after the crisis under IMF support, and interest rates have stayed below pre-crisis
levels ever since. However, we show that the crisis had a major impact on branching be-
havior by commercial banks in Thailand. Entry of new branches fell dramatically for three
years after the crisis, and for essentially the rst time in Thailand’s history, we observed
the closure of bank branches. As we document, even when entry rates recovered, entry
was not always in the places that saw exit. Thus, some communities experienced exit
and have still not seen new entry by 2010. We also argue that entry strategies changed,
meaning some communities that might have received a branch without the crisis never
received one.
In addition, bank locations impact nancial access. As we discuss below, a number
of studies measure the positive impact of bank branches on local borrowing and eco-
nomic activity, and in particular, Assuncao, Mityakov, and Townsend (2012) and Alem
and Townsend (2014) show that this is the case for particular regions in Thailand during
our sample period. Overall, we argue that the eect of the crisis on bank branching pro-
vides an unexplored channel by which the crisis impacted local communities in Thailand.
Studying the impact of the crisis on bank locations is challenging because there are
many large commercial banks in Thailand, as well as two large government-owned banks
that have many branches in both rural and urban areas. These banks may interact in com-
plex ways that are dicult to describe with simple statistics. To provide a more concrete
measure of the impact of the crisis on bank locations, we specify a dynamic structural
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model of the bank branch location problem and estimate the model on data on branch lo-
cations obtained from the Bank of Thailand. Our model addresses not only strategic and
dynamic interactions between banks but pays particular attention to the role of aggregate
variables (namely, the nancial crisis) in impacting choices.
In our model, banks choose simultaneously whether or not to enter in a very large
number of heterogeneous locations around the country of Thailand. Banks benet if their
branch is near to other branches they own, and banks suer if their branch is near the
branches of rivals. Banks have rational expectations about the shocks that rivals will
realize in the future, and account for the benet of preempting rivals in location choice.
This dynamic model of branch network formation can be dicult to solve, but we borrow
from the two-step techniques of Bajari et al. (2007) and Pakes et al. (2007) to make the
problem feasible.
In both our reduced-form and structural results we nd that banks prefer to locate their
branches near their own branches and away from rivals. In future work, we plan to use
this estimated structural model to simulate a number of counterfactual scenarios. Firstly,
we are interested in what bank branch locations would have been chosen if there had
never been a crisis, which would quantify the eect of the crisis on the branch network.
Secondly, for branches that closed in rural areas, we will estimate what level of subsidy
would be required to keep these branches protable. Finally, we could also simulate the
eects of a policy similar to the policy studied by Burgess and Pande (2005) in India, where
banks were only allowed to open a branch in an urban area if they opened branches in
four underserved areas. While we estimate structural parameters using the entire data
set, counterfactual analysis requires an explicit solution to the model, and solving the
model with many banks in thousands of locations is unlikely to be feasible. Thus, we will
focus our counterfactual analysis on small groups of potential locations where the crisis
appears to have hit particularly hard. We use the parameters of Assuncao et al. (2012) to
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compute the impact of counterfactual bank branch locations on nancial access for Thai
households.
Literature Review
The physical locations of bank branches are an important determinant of access to credit.
One reason for this is transportation costs, which are typically higher for individuals in
developing economies. Another reason is that bank-branch proximity can lower the in-
formation collection costs required to assess the viability of loans. This is in part because
credit histories may be unreliable or non-existent. A body of research nds that physical
branch locations can increase access to credit through this information channel. Nguyen
(2016) nds that bank branch closings, as a result of post-merger branch consolidations,
led to a persistent decline in local small business lending. Agarwal and Hauswald (2010)
use loan application data from a large US bank and nd that borrower proximity to bank
branches facilitated the collection of soft information, which increased access to credit for
nearby rms. Ergungor (2010) nds that the presence of bank branches increased mort-
gage originations and lowered interest-rate spreads in Ohio’s low- to moderate-income
neighborhoods. Petkov (2016) uses variation in branch deposits from new fracking wells
and variation in loan protability from real estate booms. He nds that these can aect
lending in other locations in the branch network, which is a mechanism through which
local economic shocks can propagate into distant markets.
We face the problem of estimating a model of a bank choosing the optimal network of
locations for its branches, which is a complex problem because there is an enormous num-
ber of alternative strategies. Other papers dealing with the problem of a rm choosing a
network of locations include Jia (2008), Ellickson, Houghton, and Timmins (2013), Holmes
(2011) and Zheng (2016), who each deal with discount retail stores in the US. We side-step
the complexity by only considering small deviations around the observed network strat-
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egy, similar to Holmes (2011) but in a multi-player setting. Specically, we consider the
alternative strategy where a bank chooses to deviate from the observed branch network
in only one location at a time. We allow for the deviation of a rm to aect the payos at
other locations, and thus to aect future actions by the rm and its rivals. To reduce the
computational burden, however, we assume that the spillovers dissipate and do not aect
payos at locations beyond some distance.
To protect themselves from the risks associated with local economic shocks, banks
often diversify their network of bank branches in geographically dierent areas. Aguirre-
gabiria, Clark, and Wang (2016) study the geographic risk diversication eorts of banks
after the removal of the Riegle-Neal Act, which had restricted branch-network expansion
in the US. Assuncao et al. (2012) study the expansion of the largest government bank,
the Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC). They seek to identify the
BAAC’s objective function: if the BAAC seeks to maximize access to nancial services,
regardless of provider, or take into account the prots of commercial banks in its entry
locations. They nd that the BAAC enters into areas that are unlikely to be served by
commercial banks and prefers that individuals are served by commercial banks. Alem
and Townsend (2014) also nd that the BAAC is helpful in smoothing consumption and
investment using distance to the nearest branch as an instrument.
3.2 Background: The 1997 Financial Crisis and the Banking Indus-
try
3.2.1 The 1997 Financial Crisis
From 1985-1996, Thailand had the highest rate of economic growth in the world. During
this time, it maintained a low ination rate, low unemployment and a stable exchange
rate. The exchange rate was tied to a basket of dominant world currencies, with a high
weight on the US dollar. Thailand’s high growth and stability, therefore, made it very
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Figure 3·1: Thai Baht vs. US dollar exchange rate. Data source: US Federal
Reserve
attractive to foreign investors.
However, a number of shocks made it dicult to maintain a xed exchange rate. The
real estate boom resulted in supply eventually exceeding demand and the number of va-
cancies increased. Borrowers began to default on their loans and the US raised interest
rates, which diverted investment away from Southeast Asia. The country had a current
account decit for a number of years and the central bank was running out of the foreign
reserves required to maintain the xed exchange rate. In May 1997, with an imminent
move towards a exible exchange rate regime, there were speculative attacks from cur-
rency traders to exploit the situation. The speculative attacks became a self-fullling
prophecy when Thailand eventually let the Baht oat in July 1997. It immediately ex-
perienced an enormous devaluation, as shown in Figure 3·1, and the economy went into
crisis.
Soon after, the IMF stepped in to help stabilize the economy. Figure 3·2 shows various
macroeconomic indicators for Thailand. GDP growth was negative for only two years
and then returned to healthy growth. Even during the height of the crisis, unemployment
only reached 3.5%. By 2002, unemployment had fallen to 1.5%. Thus, we might conclude
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Figure 3·2: Macroeconomic indicators for Thailand. Data source: World
Bank
that Thailand recovered from the crisis within a few years. As we will see, however, the
slowdown in branch openings and the closures of existing bank branches continued on
until 2003-2004, and the eects of the closures were long-lived in some circumstances.
3.2.2 The Banking Industry
Both commercial and government banks operate in Thailand. As of the end of 2010, there
were 29 dierent commercial banks in our data, which includes all branches in Thailand
outside the Bangkok Metropolitan Area. The commercial banks combined had 4,303 bank
branches across the country. Of these banks, however, only 9 had more than 100 bank
branches in the nal period in our data. There is very little presence of foreign banks
outside of Bangkok.
There are six dierent government banks with a total of 2,109 branches at the end
of 2010. The two largest government banks are the Government Savings Bank (GSB) and
the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC), which have 499 branches
and 1,429 branches each respectively. As documented by Assuncao et al. (2012) and as we
will see in our reduced-form results below, the BAAC do not tend to locate their branches
in urban areas. Their motives are therefore less likely to be prot-oriented. The GSB, on
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Figure 3·3: Number of branches, entries and exits for commercial and
government banks.
the other hand, does locate its branches in more urban areas, with the aim of mobilizing
savings.
Figure 3·3 shows the total number of bank branches of commercial and government
banks since 1960. The large rise in government bank branches in 1966 is the opening of
the Bank of Agricultural and Agricultural Cooperatives, which set up a large number of
branches across various parts of the country. There has been a large growth in the number
of commercial banks over the last decades. When the crisis hit in 1997, this growth slowed
and eventually in the early 2000s the net number of branches decreased. Figure 3·3b
focuses on our sample period of the 1990s and 2000s. There was no exit of government
branches at any point in time and no exit of commercial banks prior to the year 2000.
When the crisis hit in 1997, both commercial and government banks slowed the growth
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Figure 3·4: Net prot per branch over time from the banks’ annual reports
(in millions of Thai Baht).
of their branch networks. By 2000, commercial banks began to close large numbers of
bank branches which continued on throughout time.
Figure 3·4 shows the average per-branch net prot for the nine largest banks. Using
the annual reports of the banks, we divide the reported net prot by the total reported
number of branches1. Note that this includes the prots from the Bangkok Metropolitan
Area which we exclude from our analysis. We can see that there is co-movement over
time in the average prot per branch, with only a few outliers. In the years leading up to
the crisis, Bangkok Bank’s per-branch prots were rising steadily. During the nancial
crisis in the late nineties, the banks reported huge losses, some suering more than others.
1Not all annual reports could be obtained, and in some of the annual reports, the total number of branches
were not reported. We present the data from all readily available annual reports.
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Banks began to recover in the early 2000s and prots rose slowly year-by-year thereafter.
We will use these annual report data when converting our prot estimates to dollar values.
Out of the locations where bank branches closed, in many locations it was a number
of years before the bank branches were replaced. Figure 3·5 shows an example area in
northern Thailand which was badly aected by the crisis. The red points denote bank-
branch locations, the gray lines show the road network, and the colors in the heatmap
show the distance to the nearest bank branch. On the eve of the crisis in 1996, the area in
the center of the map was reasonably well-served by branches. Following the crisis, one
branch closed in 2001 and another closed in 2003. Even by the end of the data in 2010,
these locations which saw their branches close did not see a new one reopen and are now
very far to the nearest bank branch. While on aggregate the number of bank branches
recovered some years after the crisis, there were a large number of areas which became
underserved for many years following the crisis.
3.3 A Model of Branch Location Choice
3.3.1 Model Setup
We use a variation of the Ericson and Pakes (1995) model to study the strategic interaction
between the commercial banks. There are F commercial banks where each bank is indexed
by f and two government banks, the Bank of Agricultural and Agricultural Cooperatives
(BAAC) and the Government Savings Bank (GSB). Each bank can have up to one branch
in each location ` ∈ {1, . . . ,L}. However, more than one bank can have a branch in the
same location. A location, therefore, can be thought of a street block in a town. This
is motivated by the fact that our branch location data is not ne enough to distinguish
locations that are very close, such as on the same street block, and that we often observe
more than one branch at the same location. In each location ` and each period t , each bank
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Figure 3·5: Distance to nearest commercial branch in the Phrae Changwat
following the nancial crisis, 1996, 2001, 2003 and 2010.
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f is either choosing whether to (a) open a branch or do nothing if it currently does not
have an active branch in location ` or (b) to close its branch or do nothing if it currently
has an active branch in location `.
Let a f `t ∈ {0, 1} indicate whether bank f has a branch in location ` at time t . The
vector st ∈ S ⊆ RS is the market state, where S is set of potential states of the market.
The market state is observable to all banks and contains information such as the market
attractiveness of each location, the state of the economy, and the locations of every active
branch of each bank in the country. The bank also receives an action-specic private
information shock each period for each location
{(
ν0
f `t
,ν1
f `t
)}L
`=1
= ν f t ∈ V ⊆ R2L. This
is observable only to the bank.
The prots for an branch are pi f `
(
a f `t , st ,ν f `t
)
. We normalize inactive branch prots
to the private information shock pi f `
(
a f `t = 0, st ,ν f `t
)
= ν0
f `t
for a f `t = 0. In addition,
banks pay a xed cost θec for opening a branch. The bank’s total prot in a period is the
sum over all locations in which it has a branch:
pi f
(
a f t , st ,ν f t
)
=
L∑`
=1
[
pi f `
(
a f `t , st ,ν f `t
) − θec1{a f `t = 1,a f `t−1 = 0}]
where a f t =
{
a f `t
}L
`=1. The value function for the bank is then the expected discounted
sum of prots:
Vf
(
a f t , st ,ν f t
)
= E
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tpi f
(
a f τ , sτ ,ν f τ
)  st
]
where β is the common discount factor for all banks.
3.3.2 Markov Perfect Equilibrium
Each period, the bank chooses a f t to maximize: Vf
(
a f t , st ,ν f t
)
. A strategyσ f : S×V →
{0, 1}L maps the current state and private information shocks into a branch opening or
closing decision at each location. Let σ =
{
σ f
}F
f =1 be the strategy prole for all banks.
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If all banks play the strategy σ , the value function for each bank is Vf
(
σ , st ,ν f t
)
. We
call σ a Markov Perfect Equilibrium if each bank does not want to deviate to any other
alternative strategy σ ′
f
, provided all other banks continue to play according to σ . That
is, for each bank, for each alternative strategy σ ′
f
and for each value of the state vector
st ∈ S, we have that:
Vf
(
σ , st ,ν f t
) ≥ Vf (σ ′f ,σ−f , st ,ν f t )
3.4 Data
3.4.1 Bank Branch Data
The bank branch data from the Bank of Thailand contains data on the branches of all
banks operating in Thailand from 1927-2010 outside the Bangkok Metropolitan Area. For
each bank branch we have the open date, the close date (if any), GPS coordinates, which
bank owns the branch, and whether the bank was a commercial or government bank2. We
supplement this data with the total net prot and the total number of branches (including
the Bangkok Metropolitan Area) per bank from the annual reports of each bank.
3.4.2 Driving Distance Between Bank Branches
We use the driving distance between bank branches to determine whether they are com-
peting. To calculate the driving distance between bank branch locations, we use the
Google Maps Distance Matrix API3. The Distance Matrix API does not take into account
the real-time trac conditions and therefore it does not depend on the time of day the
distances were calculated. Figure C·1 shows the relationship between great circle dis-
2More information is available at https://townsend-gis.mit.edu/thaigis/
3More information is available at:
https://developers.google.com/maps/documentation/distance-matrix
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tance and driving distance for all branches within a great circle distance of 60km4. Both
are highly correlated but there are still many branch location pairs that are much fur-
ther away when you take into account the road network between them. The very large
dierences are often related to water features, such as two locations being on dierent
peninsulas or two locations being separated by a river with no nearby bridge. These are
extreme outliers and 98% of location pairs are less than twice as far when considering
the road network between them. Locations that are on small islands o the coast are as-
sumed not to be connected to branches on the mainland, as there was no driving route
found between them.
3.4.3 Night Lights Data
Accurate proxies for demand are not readily available at a ne geographic level for Thai-
land. Therefore we use night lights data from the National Oceanic and Atmosphere Ad-
ministration5 to proxy market attractiveness. Night lights data have been used as proxies
for population and GDP in an ever-increasing number of applications, for example, Hen-
derson et al. (2011, 2012), Bleakley and Lin (2012), Gennaioli et al. (2013), Michalopoulos
and Papaioannou (2013).
The night lights data come from satellites images captured by the US Air Force at
night between 8:30 PM and 10:00 PM local time around the world. These images are then
processed and cleaned to represent the average amount of light emanating from a ne
geographic location during a year. Observations obstructed by clouds are excluded, as
well as observations with light coming from forest res, gas ares, sunlight (e.g. in the
summer months) and moonlight. Values are represented on a scale that ranges from 0
to 63 which measures the amount of light captured by the camera’s sensor. This scale
4Due to limits on the number of API requests that can be made, it is not possible to calculate driving
distance between every branch location. However, we only require distances for location pairs that are close
to each other.
5More information is available at https://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/eog/dmsp/downloadV4composites.html
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(a) 1992 (b) 2001 (c) 2010
Figure 3·6: Night lights data over time.
is bottom- and top-coded, with very rural locations being bottom-coded at 0 and dense
urban areas being top-coded at 63. Top-coding is not an issue in Thailand, with only 0.27%
of the country being top-coded in the nal year of data. Data are available from 1992-2013
and are represented on grids with a 30-arc second resolution. In Thailand, one cell of data
is at a resolution of approximately 900m×900m. Therefore it straightforward to match
the night lights data to bank branch locations using the bank branches’ GPS coordinates.
As is standard in the literature, we average readings for the years where two dierent
satellite readings are available.
Figures 3·6a to 3·6c show the rst, middle and last year of our night lights data. The
night lights in the Gulf of Thailand are not measurement error; rather they are from squid
shing boats which shine bright green LED lights to attract plankton to the surface. Since
these observations are in the sea, they are not counted in our measurement of demand at
branch locations.
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Number of Number of Number Number
branches branches of entries of exits
in 1992 in 2010 1992-2010 1992-2010
Bangkok Bank 270 640 370 0
Kasikornbank 244 473 262 33
Krung Thai Bank 313 625 339 27
TMB Bank 142 292 216 66
Siam Commecial Bank 170 604 458 24
The Siam City Bank 92 248 185 29
CIMB Thai Bank 52 63 47 36
Bank of Ayudhya (Krungsri) 147 348 253 52
Thanachart 0 122 122 0
Table 3.1: Summary statistics of banks included in sample, excluding the
Bangkok Metropolitan Area.
3.5 Estimation
3.5.1 Sample Selection
We use the time period 1992-2010 which encompasses the nancial crisis. This time period
is the overlap of the night lights data, which is only available since 1992, and the bank
branch data, which is only available until 2010. There was also a merger of two of the
smaller commercial banks (Siam City Bank and Thanachart) in 2011 which is currently
not within the scope of the model.
We restrict the sample to larger banks as there are a number of small players. We use
the largest nine commercial banks of the total 18 that were active in the nal year of our
data. The branches of these nine banks make up over 94% of all commercial bank branches
in the nal year of data. Table 3.1 shows some summary statistics of the commercial banks
in the sample. Some banks are considerably larger than others. One of the banks did not
exist at the beginning of the sample but grew very fast during the boom years. Some
banks were also worse hit by the crisis while others did not close any branches.
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We take the set of locations to be the full set of locations that ever had a branch in the
data. This amounts to 2,180 locations. These are shown in Figure 3·7. In more populated
areas there are more potential locations, while smaller, rural areas have fewer potential
locations.
3.5.2 Parameterizing the Prot Function
The state variable that will capture local demand is the night lights within a 10km ra-
dius around the branch. Call this d`t . We draw a circle with radius 10km around each
branch location and sum the values of all night light grids inside the circle. An example
is shown in Figure 3·8. Night lights have been shown to be highly correlated with popu-
lation density and GDP. Therefore we believe it captures the attractiveness of a location
well.
The locations of all bank branches are part of the set of state variables, but we do not
allow all of these variables to freely enter the prot function of a bank branch. Rather, we
rely on several summary variables to determine the eect of the state on prots for the
branch. We dene the set of locations connected to a location ` as C` . m ∈ C` if location
m is within a 10km drive of location `. Due to some outliers in the dierences between
driving to a location and from a location, we consider two locations to be connected if the
minimum driving distance between them is 10km.
To capture the network eect of the bank’s own branches, we include the sum of the
bank’s other branches in locations within a 10km drive of location `. The eect of com-
petition from other commercial banks is measured as the number of competing branches
within a 10km drive of the location. Similarly, the eect of competition from BAAC and
GSB branches is measured as the number of those branches within a 10km drive. We have
experimented with alternative distance cutos and also weighting further-away branches
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Figure 3·7: The full set of locations L (red) with Amphoe borders (grey).
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Figure 3·8: Night lights within a 10km radius of a branch location. The
road network is shown in blue.
less in reduced-form estimates and they do not change the results qualitatively6.
The current year will also serve as a state variable which will capture any trends in
bank branch protability. Finally, we include a macroeconomic demand variable, mt ,
which aects all locations in the same way. This will highlight the eect of the crisis
on branch protability. With this, the prot for an active branch is parameterized as:
pi f `
(
a f `t = 1, st ,ν f `t ,θ
)
= − θec1
{
a f `,t−1 = 0
}
+ θ0 + θdd`t + θown
©­«
∑
m∈C`\`
a f mt
ª®¬+
θrival
©­«
∑
m∈C`
∑
д,f
aдmt
ª®¬ + θbaac
( ∑
m∈C`
baacmt
)
+
θдsb
( ∑
m∈C`
дsbmt
)
+ θtt + θmmt + ν
1
f `t
6An example weighting function would be
w (d) =
1 −
(
d
10
)2
if d < 10
0 otherwise
where d is driving kilometers from the branch location.
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while the prot for an inactive branch is:
pi f `
(
a f `t = 0, st ,ν f `t ,θ
)
= ν0f `t
Dene θ =
(
θec ,θ0,θd ,θown,θrival ,θbaac ,θдsb ,θt ,θm, 1
)
as the vector of structural parame-
ters and:
Ψ f `
(
a f `t , st ,ν f `t
)
=
©­«−1
{
a f `,t−1 = 0
}
a f `t ,a f `t ,d`ta f `t ,
©­«a f `t
∑
m∈C`\`
a f mt
ª®¬ ,©­«a f `t
∑
m∈C`
∑
д,f
aдmt
ª®¬ ,
(
a f `t
∑
m∈C`
baacmt
)
,(
a f `t
∑
m∈C`
дsbmt
)
,a f `tt ,a f `tmt ,a f `tν
1
f `t +
(
1 − a f `t
)
ν0f `t
)
Then we can write the prot function as a linear function of the structural parameter
vector:
pi f `
(
a f `t , st ,ν f `t ,θ
)
= θΨ f `
(
a f `t , st ,ν f `t
)
3.5.3 Value Function
The value function is the expected present discounted value of future bank prots. Since
the prot function is linear in θ , the value function is also linear in θ :
Vf
(
a f t , st ,ν f t
)
=E
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t
L∑`
=1
pi f `
(
a f `t , sτ ,ν f `τ ,θ
) ]
=E
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t
L∑`
=1
θΨ f `
(
a f `τ , sτ ,ν f `τ
) ]
=E
[ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t
L∑`
=1
Ψ f `
(
sτ ,ν f `τ
) ]
︸                                  ︷︷                                  ︸
≡W f (af t ,st ,ν f t )
θ
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The value function from equilibrium play is then Vf
(
σ , st ,ν f t
)
= W f
(
σ , st ,ν f t
)
θ and
from a deviation is Vf
(
σ ′
f
,σ−f , st ,ν f t
)
=W f
(
σ ′
f
,σ−f , st ,ν f t
)
θ . The equilibrium con-
dition then becomes:[
W f
(
σ , st ,ν f t
) −W f (σ ′f ,σ−f , st ,ν f t )] θ ≥ 0, ∀σ ′f ,∀f ∈ F .
The number of alternative strategies is 2L−1, whereL = 2180. This number is prohibitively
large. To reduce the computational burden associated with calculating the value function
for all alternative strategies, we only consider deviations in one location at a time. We
dene σ ′
f `
as the strategy where the rm deviates from the observed strategy only in
location `. With this, there are only L alternative strategies for each rm in each period.
Essentially, we model the rm as if it makes independent choices at each location. We
still address the network formation problem in the sense that at each location the bank
recognizes that entry or exit aects the protability of nearby locations.
Due to the linearity of the payo function,W f
(
σ , st ,ν f t
)
andW f
(
σ ′
f `
,σ−f , st ,ν f t
)
do not depend on θ , and so only need to be computed once before estimation. Then we
can search over θ to t the data as best as possible. We can estimate the parameters in
two steps, rather than recalculatingW f or each trial parameter value.
3.5.4 EstimatingW f
(
σ , st ,ν f t
)
andW f
(
σ ′
f `
,σ−f , st ,ν f t
)
The vectorW f
(
σ , st ,ν f t
)
is estimated by taking the average of many paths of simulated
actions and state variables forward in time and calculating the prot for the rm in each
period. We simulate forward T periods (rather than ∞), far enough such that, after dis-
counting, further time periods aect current decisions very little. Simulated actions and
state variables are drawn from reduced-form approximations of the policy functions and
transition functions, essentially projecting actions and new state variables on existing
state variables. If we simulate forward P paths, T periods into the future, Ŵ f
(
σ , st ,ν f t
)
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and Ŵ f
(
σ ′
f `
,σ−f , st ,ν f t
)
are:
Ŵ f
(
σ , st ,ν f t
)
=
1
P
P∑
p=1
t+T∑
τ=t
βτ−t
L∑`
=1
Ψ f `
(
σ , sτp,ν f `τp
)
Ŵ f
(
σ ′f `,σ−f , st ,ν f t
)
=
1
P
P∑
p=1
t+T∑
τ=t
βτ−t
L∑`
=1
Ψ f `
(
σ ′f `,σ−f , sτp,ν f `τp
)
We take P = 50, T = 50 and β = 0.9. T = 50 with β = 0.9 will account for approximately
99.5% of a constant innite stream. We take P = 50 because simulating a full path for each
observation is computationally costly. We will now describe how the paths are simulated
in more detail for each case.
Reduced-Form Estimate of the Equilibrium Policy Function
To simulate actions forward for both commercial and government banks, we need a func-
tion giving the probability of each rm’s action given the current state. This is called
the equilibrium policy function. We do this using linear probability models for the com-
mercial entry and exit decisions and government entry decisions, controlling for location
and year xed eects. Table 3.2 shows the results. There are no estimates for govern-
ment branch exit because we do not observe any government branch exit. We assume
government branches never close in our structural modeling.
Commercial banks are more likely to enter and less likely to exit in areas with higher
values of night lights. The same is true for the GSB, which operate mostly in urban areas,
but not true for the BAAC, which locates in both urban and rural areas. Commercial banks
prefer to locate near their own existing branches and are less likely to exit in the pres-
ence of nearby branches. This implies that the positive spillovers from nearby branches
(for example, from shared marketing eorts) dominate any cannibalization eects. On
the other hand, government banks are less likely to enter in areas where they are already
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Private Private BAAC GSB
entry exit entry entry
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Night lights 0.002 12??? −0.001 73?? 0.000 58 0.001 77???
(0.000 47) (0.000 68) (0.001 79) (0.000 63)
# Own branches 0.004 27??? −0.000 65??
(0.000 94) (0.000 30)
# Private branches 0.001 32??? 0.001 28???
(0.000 40) (0.000 22)
# Rival bank branches −0.000 27??? 0.000 28???
(0.000 08) (0.000 09)
# BAAC branches −0.000 40 −0.000 19 −0.068 11??? 0.000 94
(0.000 41) (0.000 78) (0.005 77) (0.000 90)
# GSB branches 0.003 90??? −0.000 36 0.001 58 −0.026 92???
(0.001 17) (0.000 78) (0.002 77) (0.002 97)
Year xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Location xed eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 301699 30212 36879 36879
Mean dependent variable 0.004 70 0.006 85 0.019 14 0.005 50
?p < 0.1, ??p < 0.05, ???p < 0.01.
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the province level (77 clusters).
Table 3.2: First-stage equilibrium policy function estimates.
present. Commercial banks are more likely to enter and less likely to exit in areas with
less competition from rival commercial branches. For government branches, the coe-
cients are for the most part insignicant, although positive in the case of GSB branches.
Similarly, government branches are not deterred by the presence of commercial branches.
These results give some evidence that commercial and government banks are not directly
competing.
Figure 3·9 shows the evolution of the year xed eects over time for the four models.
The aftermath of the nancial crisis decreased the year xed eect for commercial entry
and sharply increased that for exit. When simulating forward, we assume the year xed
for commercial entry follows an AR(1) process. We estimate the process excluding obser-
vations during the crash. This means that before the crash, all banks believed such a fall
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Figure 3·9: Year xed eects for the equilibrium policy function.
was very unlikely. Following the recovery from the crash, all banks believe a crash of such
severity would be unlikely to happen again. During the crash, banks are uncertain about
how long the crash will persist. For commercial exit, we assume the year xed eect is
zero until it increased and assume it to follow an AR(1) after that. Banks before the crisis,
therefore, did not expect it to increase. For government banks, we assume it follows an
AR(1) throughout the entire period.
State Transition Functions
We assume night lights are unaected by branch location decisions. The value of night
lights at each branch location is assumed to continue to grow at the rate observed in the
data with independent, normally-distributed shocks. We recognize that greater access to
credit could increase development in the local economy, leading to brighter night lights.
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In fact, Young (2015) nds that the expansion of banking services in India increased night
lights after three years using a regression discontinuity design. In future, we will perform
robustness checks where we allow night lights to be aected by branch entry and exit.
For the macroeconomic demand variable, we use the year xed eect in the commercial
bank entry policy function. For its transitions, we use the same AR(1) process to project
the equilibrium policy function forward.
EstimatingW f
(
σ ′
f `
,σ−f , st ,ν f t
)
EstimatingW f
(
σ ′
f `
,σ−f , st ,ν f t
)
is similar to estimatingW f
(
σ , st ,ν f t
)
except that when
starting the simulation we deviate the action of a rm f in location ` in period t . For poten-
tial entrants, for example, if rm f in location ` entered in period t , we simulate forward
based on what would happen if it didn’t enter. For incumbents, if rm f in location `
chose to stay in the market at time t , we simulate forward based on what would happen
if it exited. If a rm deviates in a particular location, in principle we should calculate the
responses of all other rms in all other locations, because most branches are indirectly
connected in the network. Figure 3·10 shows the network of connected branch locations,
where each node is a branch location and a connection is dened as being within a 10km
drive from one another. A branch location can be connected to only a few nodes directly
but can be indirectly connected to many more nodes.
Calculating the reaction of every rm in every location, in each period into the future,
and in every simulated path would be infeasible. Rather, we assume that the spillover
eect of a deviation dies out quickly. We assume that the spillover eect of a deviation only
goes as far as locations within 10km. This reduces the computational load signicantly.
This assumption is illustrated in Figure 3·11. Suppose we are deviating rm f ’s action in
location ` at time t , where location ` is the green circle in the gure. When simulating
forward to future time periods, we allow rms in the blue triangle locations (and the green
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Figure 3·10: The network of connected branch locations. Two nodes are
connected if they are within 10km drive from each other.
circle location) to respond to this deviation. If rms in the blue triangle locations change
their action, we assume that rms in the red square locations and beyond cannot change
their action to what would happen if there were no deviation.
However, deviations of the branches in the blue triangle locations can aect the prof-
its of branches in the red square locations, as they are within 10km of each other. For
this reason, we also need to track the changes to the rm’s prots in the red locations.
Therefore we track the prots of all branches within 20km of the deviating location. For
branches outside the 20km circle, we assume the prots are unchanged by the deviations.
3.5.5 Second-Stage Estimation
We assume that the private information shocks at location `, ν1
f `t
and ν0
f `t
are distributed
according to a Type I extreme value distribution. Since in each location other than `, the
bank is playing the same action underσ f asσ ′f ` , all the instantaneous private information
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Figure 3·11: Suppose rm f in the green circle deviates. All rms in blue
triangles and green circle can respond in future periods. All rms in the
red squares can’t respond, but we need to recalculate rm f ’s prots in
those red squares. Prots for rms outside the outer circle are assumed
not to change.
shocks for those locations cancel out. Therefore, given estimates of W f
(
σ , st ,ν f t
)
and
W f
(
σ ′
f `
,σ−f , st ,ν f t
)
and a value of the parameter vector θ , the probability that the rm
in the model chooses the action played in the data is:
Pr
(
a f `t |θ
)
=
exp
{[
Ŵ f
(
σ , st ,ν f t
) −Ŵ f (σ ′f `,σ−f , st ,ν f t )] · θ }
1 + exp
{[
Ŵ f
(
σ , st ,ν f t
) −Ŵ f (σ ′f `,σ−f , st ,ν f t )] · θ }
With this, we can estimate θ is using maximum likelihood as follows:
θˆ = argmax
θ
T∑
t=1
F∑
f =1
L∑`
=1
log
(
Pr
(
a f `t |θ
) )
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Estimate Standard Error
Entry Cost 11.757 (0.115)
Constant 0.888 (0.020)
Night lights 0.043 (0.002)
Own branches 0.024 (0.003)
Rival commercial branches −0.012 (0.001)
BAAC branches −0.077 (0.005)
GSB branches 0.041 (0.005)
Time Trend 0.003 (0.001)
Macro shock 42.095 (0.003)
Table 3.3: Second-stage structural parameter estimates. Standard errors
are from using the Hessian of the likelihood function and do not take into
account simulation error from the rst stage.
3.6 Results
3.6.1 Prot Function Parameter Estimates
Table 3.3 shows the structural parameter estimates. The coecients have a similar in-
terpretation as the reduced-form estimates for the entry policy function: banks prefer to
locate branches in areas with greater demand, near their existing branches and further
away from rival branches. Banks are also aected by the macroeconomic shock aecting
all branches.
We can use information from the annual reports of each bank to convert these values
into monetary terms. The average per-branch prot in 2010, weighted by the number of
branches, is 19.53 million Baht (approximately 620,000 USD). The average ow prot from
the model in locations in the data is 0.89. Therefore one unit in the model is 22.01 million.
Using this, the entry of a rival branch nearby reduces prots by on average 8,673 USD per
year.
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3.6.2 Counterfactual Simulations
The model and parameter estimates allow for the of simulation counterfactual scenarios.
However, this would involve doing a full solution of the dynamic game. For the full sample
of locations, this would be incredibly computationally burdensome. In future work, we
will simulate counterfactual scenarios on a subsample of the data, small enough that a full
solution would be feasible.
One counterfactual scenario we will simulate is a counterfactual where the nancial
crisis did not occur. This would involve using counterfactual values of the demand vari-
able, d`t , and macro variable,mt , for no crisis and solving for new branch location strate-
gies. This would provide an estimate of the full eect of the crisis on the bank branch
network. Using the dierences in distance between villages and branches in the actual
and counterfactual scenarios, together with causal estimates of the eect of bank-branch
distance and access to loans from the literature, we can estimate the eect of the crisis on
nancial access.
If the goal of the policymaker is to maintain access to nancial services in rural areas,
the model can inform of how eective alternative policies are at achieving this goal. For
example, subsidies can be given to loss-making branches to keep them open. This could be
done by an appropriate change in the constant term in the prot functions. Alternatively,
nes could be put in place for banks that close rural branches so that banks need to cross-
subsidize rural branches with more-protable urban branches. Burgess and Pande (2005)
also study a policy that was in place in India where banks could only open a branch in
an urban area if they open four branches in underserved areas: a 1:4 licensing policy.
We could use the estimated model to examine how the banks’ location strategies would
change if such a policy would be introduced in Thailand. We could also estimate whether
a 1:1 policy, rather than a 1:4 policy, could be more eective.
99
3.7 Conclusion
In this paper, we argue that the eect of nancial crises on bank branch location choices
provides an unexplored channel by which crises aect access to credit. We study the loca-
tion strategies of banks in Thailand since the 1990s in the context of a dynamic structural
model of oligopolistic location choice. In the model, we allow for complementarity in
payos for bank branches in nearby locations, as well as competitive eects between ri-
val banks. Using this model in future work, we will predict the evolution of bank branch
locations under the counterfactual scenarios of no nancial crisis in 1997 and alternative
banking policies that focus on rural bank branch access. We use these results to compute
the impact of these counterfactual scenarios on nancial access, based on previous studies
of the eect of banking locations on access.
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Appendix A
Appendices to Social Impacts of New Radio
Markets in Ghana: A Dynamic Structural
Analysis
Figure A·1: Road
network in Ghana
(Data Source: Open-
StreetMap)
Figure A·2: Dis-
tance to nearest road
(in kilometers)
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Figure A·3: Demographic Health Survey cluster locations by year.
Figure A·4: Maps of log population in 1990, 2000, 2010. Years 1990 and
2000 come directly from NASA SEDAC. 2010 was generated using census
and night lights data.
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(a) Additional potential entrants are placed at
the centroid of all night lights clusters, repre-
senting settled areas in the country. The black
outlines are the night lights clusters and the red
points are their centroids.
(b) Locations of all potential entrants, both
rms from data and centroids of night lights
clusters.
Figure A·5: Potential entrant locations.
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Commercial Potential Entrant
(a) Share at least 10% of coverage.
Commercial Potential Entrant
(b) Share at least 25% of coverage.
Commercial Potential Entrant
(c) Share at least 50% of coverage.
Commercial Potential Entrant
(d) Share at least 75% of coverage.
Figure A·6: Networks of radio stations where a connection between two
stations is dened as the stations sharing at least a certain percentage of
coverage.
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Figure A·7: Clusters of radio stations found by the community walk-
trap algorithm in Pons and Latapy (2005). Points with the same color are
grouped in the same cluster.
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Figure A·8: Fit using a Poisson process to model the transition between
becoming authorized and actively broadcasting. Time periods are in quar-
ters.
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Figure A·9: Structural parameter estimates when using alternative node
cutos for allowing reactions from rivals.
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Appendix B
Appendices to Radio Regulation and Voter
Turnout in Benin
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Log Commune Population  
Figure B·1: Maps of log commune population in Benin during Census
years.
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Figure B·2: Percentage of communes with a station without regulatory
ineciency. In the counterfactual, we set λ = 1 and allow entry every
year, rather than only 1997, 1998, 2002 and 2007, as in the data.
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Appendix C
Appendices to Branch Location Strategies and
Financial Service Access in Thai Banking
Figure C·1: Driving distance versus great circle distance between all
branch locations within 60km. The red line is a 45◦-degree line from the
origin.
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